NEWPORT
VERMONT

THE JUNCTION OF THE CANADIAN PACIFIC AND THE BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD SYSTEMS.



MASSAWIPPI VALLEY

PASSUMPSIC RAILROAD

CANADIAN PACIFIC
IN
VERMONT

DANIEL WILLARD RIDES THE LINE.

DANIEL WILLARD WAS BORN IN VERMONT AND STARTED HIS RAILROAD CAREER ON THE PASSUMPSIC RAIALROAD AND WOULD RISE OVER THE YEARS TO BECOME THE PRESISENT OF THE HUGE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILWAY. A LARGE PART OF HIS

LEGACY IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO HISTORICAL RAILROAD COLLECTION.

CHAPTER IV

DANIEL WILLARD—ENGINEER

AT LAST DANIEL WILLARD was to realize the fullness of his youthful ambition. He was to become a railroad engineer. He had loved engines almost from the first sight of the *Governor Smith* of the Vermont Central as it went racing its way across his father's farm. He had seen many other engines since that day—engines of the well-found Northern Railroad of New Hampshire; the funny little fellows of the Southeastern of Canada; one or two of the sleek and aristocratic Boston and Albany, far to the south; good pullers on the Connecticut Valley and the Fitchburg, but none of these have ever had the appeal to him of the *Governor Smith,* the engine which combined beauty with efficiency, which could run a mile in sixty seconds with a goodly train behind it and think nothing of it.

"That locomotive had more to do with my becoming a railroad man than any other thing I can remember. It was one of the most beautiful locomotives ever built, certainly the most beautiful I had seen as a boy, and I made a point to see it as often as I could," says Daniel Willard.

He will take a photograph of the *Governor Smith* today and point out the beauty of its lines, for they still appeal to him. He notes the symmetry of its design and the raciness of its lines; the oil paintings on both sides of the

he was now on a passenger run: the night express from Montreal down to Boston; engine *Dartmouth* and four cars, including the sleeper; engineer Shorey at the throttle, hauling her all the way over the Passumpsic from Newport to Woodsville, sixty-five miles.

Shorey was an experienced engine runner, but with one bad habit in his work. In the phrase of the road, he "petted his engine." There was a rather mean upgrade just below Lyndonville—eight or ten miles of it, thirty to thirty-five feet to the mile—and by his curious way of holding back the old blunderbuss, the *Dartmouth* invariably would come up to the summit of the grade ten or twelve minutes late. Dan Willard on his side of the cab was worried.

The track on the Connecticut and Passumpsic Rivers in those days was nothing to brag about. The rails were each twenty-four feet long and they weighed about forty-five pounds to the yard. It was, at the best, poor track and if you ran it too rapidly your passengers were kept awake with the racket and the pitching.

Nightly, in an endeavor to make up all this lost time, Shorey would push the *Dartmouth* and her little train down the other side of the Lyndonville grade at a terrific rate; and still come into Woodsville depot ten to eighteen minutes late all the time. Daniel Willard distinctly did not like this. It was not the sort of railroading that he had been led to anticipate and he had some regard for his own precious neck (he already had been in a derailment and it was no pleasant experience). So he went to Harley Folsom to have his run changed. The next engineer he drew was Robert McVicar who was a different sort of an engine-runner—quite the star man of the whole road.

causing damage to property in case things had not worked out as I had expected. Fortunately they did work out as I had expected, and nothing happened, but I was careful to keep out of Mr. Brigham's sight for a time until he had had a chance to forget what was uppermost in my mind. Whether he actually forgot it or not, I do not know. He never said anything to me about it. Silent treatment sometimes, I think, is better than more drastic action."

tender... the graceful pointed arches of the cab windows ... the "star decorations" between the drivers... the filigree work and painting here and there all over the engine... the shining brass of the metal work. He comments:

"Note the attitude of pride and sangfroid on the part of that engineer. He wears his cap at a jaunty angle, the white shirt that he is wearing suggests that he is handling a clean piece of machinery, his dressy vest and his long gold watch chain denote the prosperity of his profession. Engineers of his type were the idols of the countryside in those days. They were regarded in almost the same esteem as the president of the town bank or the head of its largest business enterprise. No wonder the boys living along the road in those days looked up to the engineer's job, as I did, as about the height of their ambition."

At nineteen years of age and still weighing scarcely 125 pounds, he was adjudged ready and fit to run a locomotive himself, to take it out upon the open line and to assume full responsibility for its safe handling. There hardly has been a time in Daniel Willard's life when he has not been asked to accept responsibility. He had it when he filled the wood-box at seven; when he taught school at fifteen.

He was ordered to report for duty at the roundhouse of the Connecticut and Passumpsic, at Lyndonville. Just why the Passumpsic's chief shops and roundhouse were not at St. Johnsbury, seemingly a far more logical place, it was hard to discover. When one dug deeply enough into the history of the little road, however, he found that it all went back to a row between the two Vermont towns in the early days. Lyndonville won!

The shops were within easy walking distance from the

somewhat pretentious two-storied brick passenger station on the main street. They formed a considerable plant. There at the end of the 'seventies the road had about thirty locomotives and their proper care and maintenance was no small business.

To this day Daniel Willard can tell you the name and number of each of the engines of the Connecticut and Passumpsic—Number One, the *Caledonia* (named for the county in which Lyndonville is situated)—Number Two, the *Green Mountain Boy* (enough said)—Number Three, the *Orange*—Number Four, the *Orleans* (another Vermont county)—Number Five, the *Dartmouth*—Number Six, the *Enterprise*—Number Seven, the *Magog*—Number Eight, the *Massawippi*—so the list runs. He remembers most of the engineers as well, for they still stuck to the pleasant old-fashioned habit of assigning a particular engine to each engineer.

Best of all he remembers the Number Twenty-nine, the *W. K. Blodgett,* the engine which finally he came to drive and to love. The *Blodgett* was not particularly loved by most of the Connecticut and Passumpsic people. For one thing, she was an outsider. The road had had the habit of building its own engines; that is, they called it building the engines, when, as a matter of fact, it was for the most part a sort of assembly job. Still the back shop there at Lyndonville could do a mighty fine job when it was called upon to rivet and weld a boiler for a new piece of power, and they were not afraid, either, to forge a truck frame when it had to be done.

The *Blodgett* was different. The *Blodgett* was an outsider, not a product in any way of the Lyndonville shop. She was Rhode Island built and the men on the Connecti-

cut and Passumpsic didn't like her, both because of that and because she did not have a water-glass on her boiler. Instead there were three or four little gauge-cocks and you had to put in some time and effort occasionally to make sure that your water was well up over the crownsheet. But Daniel Willard did not particularly mind taking time and effort, for when you came to know the *Blodgett,* to understand her and she to understand you, there was no other bit of motive power on the road which could do a tidier bit of pulling.

With her, Willard would pull freights up the long grade on the Canadian side of the Line as you came near Lennoxville. That hill was a mean one. You cut your train (freight train, of course) in two and left half the cars standing on the main while you toted the first half up; then you went back and toted up the rest of the train. Seems like rather slow railroading these days, but that's the way they had to do it on the old Connecticut and Passumpsic.

Here is about the way you had to handle the *W. K. Blodgett.* You had to understand those gauge-cocks; you had to understand everything else about the cab-end of that boiler of hers—the rest of the engine as well. You could nurse her—without petting her as Shorey used to do with his engine. You had to understand the line as well and know just when to put the steam on and then cut it off—throttle lever out a notch here, in a notch again there. And then, soon, you were getting twenty-two cars up the hill into Stanstead Junction, no stalling and no losing a lot of time with "doubling." When Daniel Willard could do that trick he began to suspect that at last he really was an engineer. He could make the *Blodgett* snake its twenty-two cars along the level stretches at an even twenty-five to thirty

miles an hour, which was a little more than the running schedule demanded. He suspected that they had given him the *Blodgett* because no other engineer on the road could be induced to take her. And here he was—making good with her!

There came the time, almost inevitably, when young Engineer Willard had to go through his first accident, bringing a freight down over the line—this was before he tackled the *Blodgett*. There was a nasty derailment at Folsom's Crossing, just one mile north of Lyndonville. Let Engineer Willard tell the story in his own words:

"I was running a locomotive named the *Amos Barnes,* that being the name of a man who was at one time a passenger conductor on the Passumpsic railroad and, later on, a director of the company. Our train left Sherbrooke in the early morning and should have arrived at Lyndonville, its destination, in the late afternoon. We were delayed, however, getting by a burning shed filled with company wood for locomotive use at Smith's Mills (Canada) and so we were two or three hours late at the time of the accident and it had become quite dark. Furthermore it had been raining near where the accident took place and considerable gravel had washed onto the tracks at the highway crossing. I suppose the gravel was four or five inches deep over the rail and filled up the flanges. We were running at the time, I suppose, about fifteen or eighteen miles an hour and were only about one mile from Lyndonville station, the end of our run. Suddenly the engine began to ride very roughly, the headlight went out—meaning, it stopped burning—and we were in the dark. It soon became apparent, in much less time that I am taking to tell it, that the engine was off the track and running on the ties, and

I concluded that I had better get off, and I did so—after taking time, however, to reverse the engine. We had no airbrakes in those days. I jumped off in a somewhat shallow cut through a sand and gravel formation and naturally fell upon my face, but I was not injured. I got up immediately and with all the haste possible began to climb up the side of the cut away from the track because I expected that the cars following the engine would be derailed and might pile up on top of me."

Young Engineer Willard had been taught by his fellows what to do in emergencies like that; moreover, his own common sense was of no little avail at that bewildering moment when the bulky little *Amos Barnes* was piling her nose into the gravel. But the cars failed to pile up on top of her as Daniel Willard had anticipated. He was lucky. His fireman was not so fortunate. Let Mr. Willard resume:

"My fireman also jumped off, from his side of the engine, but did not get away from the track a sufficient distance. He was caught under the tender and died the next day."

The following account of the accident, taken from the *Weekly Caledonian,* published at St. Johnsbury, September 22, 1882, tallies well with Mr. Willard's memories of it:

SERIOUS ACCIDENT

The way freight south, due at Lyndonville about 4:00 P.M., was detained several hours at Smith's Mills, P. Q. last Friday (Sept. 15, 1882) by the burning of a woodshed. It reached Folsom's Crossing about one and one-half miles north of Lyndonville at 7:20 P.M., just at the close of a heavy shower. The storm had washed the sand from the road on the crossing to a depth of six or seven inches, and when the engine struck

the sand it was thrown from the track and was followed by the tender and three of the twenty seven cars in the train. The engineer, Daniel Willard, jumped from the engine very soon after it left the track and escaped unhurt. The fireman, Ed F. Jenness of Lyndonville, did not jump, and in consequence was severely, if not fatally, injured. The engine went about fifteen feet from the track and remained right side up buried in the sand almost to the boiler. The tank lay nearby, bottom side up, and on the top of the tank and engine was a box car loaded with lumber and piled all around were the trucks of the tender and three cars. Under one of the truck beams with the engine on one side, the tender on the other, a box car directly over his head and a dozen car wheels within six feet of him, young Jenness was found. The ground underneath him had to be shoveled away before he could be released. His escape from instant death was miraculous. His recovery, at present writing, is very doubtful. His injuries are all internal; not a scratch being found on his body and no bones broken. The damage to the railroad company will probably not exceed $1500. The track was cleared for the passage of trains about 2:00 A.M.

P.S. Jenness died Wednesday.

That accident had a more profound effect upon young Willard than he realized at just that time. It gave him a new and quickened sense of responsibility for the profession he was entering—and remember he never has been a man to shirk responsibility. Moreover, having gone through a serious accident of that sort, he gained for himself a new sense of respect from his fellow workers, almost all of them men much older than himself.

They were getting used to Dan Willard by this time. Nobody seemed to care any more when he refused a drink. An odd duck, young Willard. Not always easy to understand, with all his questionings and his arguings, but a

young man to be respected always. Under that quiet exterior there lurked a quick temper. Men did not even try to play jokes on Dan Willard.

The Lyndonville shop stands today pretty much as it used to stand. It was a sizable place, brick, a sixteen-stall roundhouse, all roofed including the turntable, and then the big back shop. To get into the back shop an engine had to cross the roundhouse turntable, then the turntable had to be moved, just one track, after which there was clear track right down the middle of the shop. In the back shop they were forever hard at work. They might have the big fifty-ton *Emmons Raymond* down or the little *Pony* or the *Orleans*... but they were forever tinkering with one engine or another in there.... A locomotive looked pretty helpless and silly when it was dismantled in the back shop, but you knew that soon they would have it together again and off it would go, better than ever, snorting its yellow breath through that great balloon funnel and sending its rods and its drivers all at a tremendous pace, snaking its train through the pretty river valleys and then up over the hills.

They had good workmen in Lyndonville shop, men like John Shirley and John Hubbard and Clark Woodbury and Lucius Brigham, who was to become its master mechanic, known and respected from one end of Lyndonville to the other as "Old Brig." These men in the back shop were pretty much individualists in their way of working. Those in the machine shop alongside, like Tim Walter, for instance, who set the valves and did even more complicated and intricate jobs, worked more in gangs in the modern way of doing it.

They used to see Daniel Willard as he passed through the

shop on his way back from his engine-run to his boarding-house. It was always quite shadowy in the back shop and you could see his slim figure clearly outlined in the sunlight outside as he picked his way down the track and across the turntable—through the roundhouse and into the back shop. At that, he could have made a far shorter cut to the boardinghouse, but he seemed always to prefer going through the shop. He liked the shop. He liked to stop and talk with the men who were working there. He would watch John Shirley setting valves . . . or a gang working to get a locomotive "out of tram," which meant getting her pins straight on the quarters so there would no longer be a kick in her rods when she was under pressure. . . . And he was forever asking questions. Tim Walter, the foreman, commented on this one time to young Robert McVicar. Said he:

"Somehow he always reminds me of the Boy in the Bible who used to go into the Temple and ask the money-changers questions they could not answer."

Harley Folsom did not work in the back shop, but his office window in the second floor of the passenger station commanded a good view of the yard and from there he used to watch young Willard, too, musing to himself. He liked young Willard. There was not one of the road's engineers whom he liked better. But he wished that young Willard would keep away from those meetings they were beginning to have in a hall just off the main street of the village. Brotherhood meetings, they were called—and Harley Folsom, superintendent of the Connecticut and Passumpsic Rivers Railroad, did not approve of them in any way, shape or manner. He wished his men would keep away from them;



W. K. Blodgett—Daniel Willard's Favorite Locomotive on the Connecticut and Passumpsic



Bucking the Snows

Almost any old-time winter's day on the Connecticut and Passumpsic.



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

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

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

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

Woodsville Bridge

It carried both railroad and highway traffic from Woodsville, N. H., to Wells River, Vt.



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It carried both railroad and highway traffic from Woodsville, N. H., to Wells River, Vt.

THE CANAAN WRECKS

THE WRECK OF THE QUEBEC AND BOSTON EXPRESS.

THE CANAAN AFFAIRS

by H. Bentley Crouch

In the first decade of the twentieth century the small Grafton County, New Hampshire, town of Canaan, located on the Boston & Maine Railroad's Concord Division main line (nee Northern R.R.—now the New Hampshire Route main line) some 15 miles east of White River Jct., received instant and tragic notoriety. Not just once but twice, within almost exactly a two year period, the village of West Canaan, located 4½ miles to the west of the center of town, bore witness to fatal train collisions. The horror of the first made such an everlasting impression on the populace that even today the merest mention of the "Canaan Wreck" will evoke instant response and comment. The second, although resulting in far fewer casualties, had many similarities to its predecessor.

In the early years of the century a large percentage of the mill workers and their families in the various cities along the Merrimack River were immigrants from Canada; hence train travel was heavy between places such as Lowell, Nashua and Manchester and the cities of Montreal and Quebec City to the north. Consequently, trains with through cars for Boston were regularly scheduled between the two major cities in the Province of Quebec and the capitol city of Massachusetts.

On Sunday, September 15, 1907, train No. 34, the Montreal to Boston overnight express via the Central Vermont Railway, was scheduled to leave White River Jct. at 3:24 A.M. but because of various delays up the line did not depart from there until 5:00 A.M., one hour and 36 minutes late. Train No. 30, a similar overnight train from Quebec City to Boston via the Quebec Central Railway and crowded with people returning from the Sherbrooke Fair, had been likewise delayed and left White River Jct. at 3:56 A.M., 45 minutes after its scheduled departure time of 3:11 A.M. Its consist that morning was engine 780 (renumbered 2063 in 1911), a baggage car, coach, smoker and a sleeping car on the rear.

To the south, third class freight No. 267, with engine 688 (renumbered 1436) and 27 cars, had departed Concord, New Hampshire, at 12:45 A.M. on its normal run to White River Jct. Because of the delays to trains 30 and 34 and the desire of the dispatcher in Concord to keep No. 267 moving, he had issued orders to No. 267 at East Andover. These orders advised the crew of the freight that No. 30 would run 40 minutes late from White River Jct. to East Andover and that train No. 34 would run 30 minutes late from White River Jct. to Concord. The effect of these two orders was to allow No. 267 to meet the two passenger trains at points further north than if they were on time. This was normal and conventional operating procedure. After these orders had been delivered and No. 267 had departed East Andover, the dispatcher received further intelligence to the effect that train No. 34 had been additionally delayed. Seizing the opportunity to further advance the freight along the line, he annulled the earlier order instructing train No. 34 to

A general view of the September 15, 1907, collision at West Canaan looking towards White River Junction. The photo was taken after the fog had burned away but before the telescoped baggage car and coach had been removed from the track. Engine 688, which was on third class freight No. 267, lies on its side in the foreground.

Clinton Atkinson, H. Bentley Crouch Collection



run 30 minutes late and issued a new order which read as follows:

> Order No. 4
> September 15, 1907 Canaan
> C. & E. No. 267
> No. 34 Thirty Four will run one hour and 10 minutes late West Lebanon to East Andover

This order was to be delivered to No. 267 at Canaan and would allow that train an additional 40 minutes more time on No. 34's schedule. There had been no change in the order requiring train No. 30 to run 40 minutes late and it was the intention of the freight to meet No. 30 at Canaan. The order was put out at 3:38 A.M. and was immediately repeated back to the dispatcher by the operators at White River Jct. and East Andover as was required by the rules governing movements of trains by train order. The dispatcher had not been able to raise the operator at Canaan at that time but at 3:46 A.M. he did gain contact with him and he then gave him the order. It was repeated back and the repeat was verified by the operators at White River Jct. and East Andover. So far, so good.

When train No. 267 arrived at Canaan shortly after 4:00 A.M. they found the order board at stop and the crew retired to the telegraph office to receive their copy of the order cited above. But this order was different! For reasons never satisfactorily explained, it read: "No. 30 *Thirty* will run 1 hour and 10 minutes late. . . ." Having no reason to question the content of the order and recognizing that this order would allow them to proceed to Enfield for No. 30 if they hustled, they immediately signed for the order, returned to their train and left town. The Canaan operator reported this to the dispatcher and the order was made complete at 4:15 A.M.

So now the stage was set for tragedy. A dense lowland fog enveloped the countryside as No. 267 accelerated into the night. Visibility was almost naught and the glow from the oilburning headlight penetrated only a few feet into the murky gloom. Yet the crew was confident that they had the right of track to Enfield. Just to the north, train No. 30, running about 45 minutes late and fully expecting No. 267 to be in the clear at some station further down the line, passed the sleeping hamlet of West Canaan on the fly. About two miles east of that station, on a stretch of tangent track about a mile and a half in length, the two trains came together. Had the fog not reduced visibility to nothing it is probable that the trains would have observed each other in sufficient time to come to a stop or at least reduce speed sufficiently to lessen the impact. But such was not the case and the force of the collision was dramatic and devastating. Both locomotives were almost totally demolished and many freight cars were derailed. The tender of the engine on No. 30 was telescoped into the baggage car which in turn was telescoped into the coach behind it. At 4:24 A.M., twenty-six people, all in the coach, met instant death and twenty others were injured. Remarkably not one of the crew members of either train were killed and the occupants

of the smoking car and sleeper suffered only minor injuries and shock.

The telescoping of the cars was not an unusual phenomenon in those days of wooden equipment. In this particular case the rear end of the baggage car was yanked upward when the engine went off the track and down the embankment and the force and momentum of the opposing freight train drove the baggage car back above the frame of the coach and into the passenger compartment. The body of the baggage car destroyed every seat on the north side of the coach and most of those on the opposite side, yet the floor and frame, the roof and the south side remained practically intact.

The usual investigations were carried out by the railroad and by the New Hampshire Railroad Commissioners. All the principals involved were questioned intently with much emphasis placed on the testimony of the dispatcher in Concord and the operator at Canaan. The dispatcher's train order book and records of messages sent and received were minutely examined. Railroad officials were satisfied that the dispatcher had fulfilled his duties faithfully and in compliance with all applicable rules. They assessed the blame on the operator at Canaan who had written 30 instead of 34 on his copy of the ill-fated order. The Railroad Comissioners, on the other hand, seemed to make much of the fact that the order was issued at 3:38 A.M. and not made complete until 4:15 A.M. They appeared to confuse the made complete time (the time the dispatcher so designated the order following receipt of the information that the freight had signed for it) of 4:15 A.M. with the time the operator at Canaan repeated it back (3:46 A.M.) Their report indicated that they were under the impression that the dispatcher had not given out the order until 4:15 A.M. and felt that the supposed 37 minute lapse (from the time the dispatcher first issued the order at 3:38 A.M.) had resulted in the dispatcher confusing train No. 34 for No. 30. They chose to overlook the fact that the Canaan operator had repeated the order back at 3:46 A.M., that his verbatim repeat was verified by the other operators along the line, and that the dispatcher had properly underscored the Canaan operator's repeat in his train order book.

At this point in time and after reviewing all available evidence the conclusion appears inescapable that the night operator at Canaan made the fatal error of writing 30 instead of 34 on his copy of the order.

Although human error was the culprit at West Canaan it didn't take much imagination to realize that the similarity in the train numbers contributed in no small manner to the resultant mixup. Accordingly, the numbers of the two passenger trains involved were quickly changed, No. 30 becoming No. 4 and No. 34 being changed to No. 6. However, this logical step did not prevent another collision involving these two trains almost exactly two years later and within a very short distance of the earlier disaster.

On Tuesday, September 21, 1909, train No. 4, bound from Quebec City to Boston, was due to leave White River Jct. with an engine, baggage car, coach, smoker and two Pullmans at 3:10 A.M. Not surprisingly it was late and did not depart until 3:40 A.M. On this same morning No. 6, from Montreal to Boston, had two engines and nine cars. It was scheduled to leave White River Jct. at 3:35 A.M. but actually pulled out at 3:45 A.M., just five minutes after No. 4. No. 4's fireman had to contend with a bad load of coal and was unable to maintain a proper fire. As a result the train gradually lost



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

(Above) Although the baggage car and coach have been tipped on their sides and removed from the right-of-way to facilitate the reopening of the line, this photograph illustrates how death came so quickly to those riding in the coach. Although the exterior of the coach appears relatively intact, its interior has been completely gutted by the baggage car which has penetrated the entire length of the car.
Workmen (below) untangle the freight cars of train No. 267 following the September 15, 1907, collision with train No. 30 at West Canaan. Note the "heavy duty" wrecking crane being employed by the cleanup crew.

more time until, as it approached Pattee,[1] it had fallen behind an additional ten minutes and No. 6, with a heavier train but with two engines, had to be close behind. The engineer decided to stop at the station, build up steam and allow No. 6 to run around his train via the passing siding.

As was the case two years earlier, an impenetrable fog covered the valley and before the flagman, responding to the whistle signal from the engineer to protect the rear of No. 4, could even drop off the rear of the still-moving train, No. 6 roared out of the Stygian darkness and crashed into the rear of No. 4. Miraculously no passengers were killed in this second wreck although the lead engine of No. 6, 338 (renumbered 1155 in 1911), buried itself a good fifteen feet inside the rear Pullman car. However, a trespasser who was riding between the second engine and the baggage car of No. 6 was crushed to death and both the engineer and fireman of that engine were also killed. Ironically this engineer had been the engineer on No. 30 at the time of the earlier collision and had survived that wreck relatively unscathed.

It was not too difficult to pinpoint the cause of the second Canaan wreck. It was the responsibility of the crew of No. 4, knowing they were losing time and that No. 6 was close behind, to insure the safety of their train by dropping off lighted fuses at frequent intervals. This they failed to do and as a result No. 6 continually closed the gap until, at Pattee, they ran into the still-moving No. 4.

The Railroad Commissioners were considerably more enlightened in their investigation and report of this second tragedy at Cannan than they were with the first. Although human error and negligence were the direct causes it was obvious to all concerned that both accidents would most likely have been averted had the line been protected by automatic block signals. The Commissioners recommended that they be installed immediately. The railroad, smarting under the adverse publicity brought on by the two wrecks, could only agree and automatic block signalling was installed between Concord and Westboro and also on the White Mountains Division main line between Concord and Woodsville in 1910.



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The morning of September 21, 1909, found the lead engine of No. 6 firmly implanted inside the rear Pullman car of No. 4 following the collision at Pattee.

* * * * *

The years came and went and gradually the memories of the wrecks in Canaan grew dimmer. Collisions had become a thing of the past — the block signals had provided faithful and reliable protection for the single line of track for close to four decades. The New Hampshire Division main line had long since lived down its earlier reputation and there was nothing to indicate that August 19, 1949, would produce anything of a wayward nature.

The day was warm and clear (no fog lurking in the valley this time) and train No. 332 departed White River Jct. at 1:55 P.M., on time. This was the southbound *Ambassador* from Montreal to Boston via the Central Vermont Railway. Engine 3807, a 2000 h.p. road passenger diesel, type E7, headed up a consist of one baggage-mail car, a combine, two coaches, one chair car and another coach bringing up the rear, all of all-steel construction. Its schedule, as printed in the current employee's timetable, called for it to meet its northbound counterpart, train No. 307, at Canaan with No. 307 as the inferior train by direction (north) to take siding at that point. No. 332 had received the following order at White River Jct.:

> Order No. 23
> August 19, 1949
> C. & E. No. 332
> No. 332 meet No. 307 at Canaan[2]

At Lebanon it received an additional order:

> Order No 24
> August 19, 1949
> C. & E. No. 332
> No. 332 take siding at Canaan to meet No. 307

As No. 332 was the superior train by direction (south) it would normally hold the main track for the meet. This order reversed the procedure on this particular day. Copies of both these orders were delivered to No. 307 at Franklin.

At 2:32 P.M., No. 332 entered the passing siding at Canaan via the north

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[1] As a result of a fatal head-on collision between two freight trains near East Haverhill, N.H. on the White Mountains Division main line on March 20, 1908, in which the word "East" was inadvertently left out of a train order calling for a meet at East Haverhill, the New Hampshire Railroad Commissioners ordered the renaming of 29 stations in the state. On the Concord Division main line the following places had their names changed: North Boscawen to Gerrish, East Andover to Halcyon, Andover Plains to Alpine, West Andover to Gale, South Danbury to Converse, Grafton Center to Cardigan, West Canaan to Pattee, and East Lebanon to Mascoma. In 1910, West Lebanon was changed to Westboro.

[2] This apparent redundancy (an order specifying a meet which already was in the timetable) was occasioned by the fact that the Boston & Maine Railroad's book of rules provided superiority and right-of-track to trains of the same class by direction. In this particular instance if No. 307 could not arrive at Canaan by the time No. 332 was scheduled by the timetable to be there, then No. 307 (as the inferior train by direction) would have had to wait at Grafton (or some other point south of Canaan), regardless of how late No. 332 might be. Order No. 23 overcame this situation and positively established the meeting point. It allowed No. 307 to proceed to Canaan without regard to whether No. 332 was on time. Certain railroads at the time, the New Haven for example, did not provide for superiority by direction and established all meets by timetable and or train order.

switch and stopped in the clear of the main line, with the engine just south of the depot. At this time the baggageman (a qualified trainman), who had been riding in the engine, alighted and walked towards the south switch, ostensibly to align it for his train after the passage of No. 307. At about the same time No. 307 had passed the last block signal to the south, which had displayed a clear aspect, and was fast approaching Canaan and the meet. This train, the northbound *Ambassador*, had two diesel units on the head end – Nos. 4225A and 4225B, cab and booster units respectively of type F2, both less than three years old. The train was made up of two milk cars, a baggage-mail car, a combine, a coach, a chair car and another coach on the rear. Again, all were of all-steel construction except for the second milk car which had a steel frame and wood body. No. 307 rounded a left-hand curve just to the south of the south switch to the passing siding and while running at a speed of about 40 m.p.h. and within 100 feet of that switch the engine crew was shocked to see the baggageman of No. 332 run to the switch, unlock it and reverse its position. An emergency brake application was immediately made but the speed of No. 307 had hardly slackened when it entered the siding and struck No. 332. The time was 2:31 P.M. The force of the impact moved the entire train of No. 332 back about 85 feet. Amazingly there were no fatalities; the all-steel car construction had practically eliminated the horror of telescoping. However, not surprisingly, 221 passengers suffered injuries of varying degree and severity. In addition, 14 railroad and government (U.S. Mail) employees were also injured. The front end of the 3807, No. 332's engine, was heavily damaged and was derailed. The rest of the train remained on the rails. No. 307 did not fare so well. The lead unit, 4225A, was damaged so badly that it was scrapped as was the wood-body milk car. Both units and three cars were derailed.

The ensuing investigation by the railroad and the Interstate Commerce Commission had little difficulty in assigning the cause: the opening of the switch by the baggageman directly in the face of No. 307. The baggageman readily admitted that he had become confused and could give no explanation for his action. The I.C.C. recommended the installation of electric switch locks on hand-thrown switches in automatic block signal territory and closed their books on the case. However, it is possible to speculate as to what may have passed through the baggageman's mind in the split second he reversed the switch and returned Canaan to the front page after a forty year lapse.

The normal sequence of events would have had train No. 332 hold the main line and the switch to the passing siding would be reversed to allow No. 307 to pass around No. 332. This certainly was a routine that the baggageman had performed many times before. It is not too difficult to imagine that on this day, as No. 307 rounded the curve, the baggageman could have suddenly glanced at the switch, seen that it was lined for the main line and instinctively reacted and raced for the switch and thrown it, all the while thinking his train was on the main line rather than on the siding. To be sure, we can only conjecture as to this but it does seem to offer a reasonable explanation for a capable and otherwise reliable employee's inexplicable behavior.

The Canaan affairs are now only happenings of the past and the chances of any similar occurrence seem remote. Except for an occasional extra, the only traffic on the line is a local freight which makes a lonely round trip once a week.



Preston Johnson Collection

(Above) Engine 3807, train No. 332's power, is at the left and the lead unit of No. 307, engine 4225A, is at the right in this scene, (reproduced from a newspaper photograph) taken shortly after the collision at Canaan on August 19, 1949. The bow in the frame of the 4225A is visible, a condition which influenced the decision to scrap this engine. The lower photograph shows the second milk car in train No. 307's consist.

Dick Sanborn Collection



RESEARCH SOURCES

New Hampshire Railroad Commissioners' Reports for 1907 and 1909
I.C.C. Investigation No. 3272—October 6, 1949

WELLS RIVER, VERMONT-

WOODSVILLE, NEW HAMPSHIRE

B&M BULLETIN

1.50

SUMMER 1975



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

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The New Enginehouse was a busy facility when this photograph was taken about 1909 from the overhead highway bridge. A Groveton-bound passenger train is about to pass behind the huge coal shed. Gardner Mountain looms in the background.

WOODSVILLE: A WHITE MOUNTAIN TERMINAL

by H. Arnold Wilder

If the building of new railroads in Massachusetts in 1835 served to create early enthusiasm for rail transport in that State, the desire for railroad construction was no less evident in the neighboring States of Vermont and New Hampshire. Requests for, and the granting of charters to build lines were numerous. Most of the proposals were for lines which would extend commerce towards the west or north, with the Montreal and Quebec harbors being favorite targets. One of the earliest of these lines was the Connecticut and Passumpsic Rivers Railroad, which was granted a charter by the State of Vermont in 1835. It built north from White River Junction along its namesake rivers through Wells River, reaching St. Johnsbury in 1850, and the Province Line above Newport in 1863. Hardly had this line opened when the White Mountains Railroad built a bridge across the Connecticut at Wells River, and continued up the Lower Ammonoosuc River, reaching Littleton in 1853. It seems probable that a station was established at Woodsville (then, as now, a community in the Town of Haverhill, N.H.). A third line, the Boston, Concord and Montreal Railroad, built north from Concord, N.H., via Tilton, Laconia, Meredith and Plymouth, thence up the Baker River to Rumney and Warren, through Glencliff and Oliverian Notch to Haverhill and Woodsville, arriving there in 1853. Having arrived at the end of their first goal, they early established freight yards, an enginehouse and engine facilities, and offices in a station near the end of the Wells River bridge. Connections were made with the White Mountains Railroad across the Connecticut with the C&PR RR and, after 1873, with the Montpelier and Wells River Railroad.[1]

Building activity appears to have been dormant until after the Civil War, when the North Country towns of Whitefield, Jefferson and Lancaster agitated for action in securing railroad service, there being none nearer than the Grand Trunk at Groveton. The Lancaster Town History records that the BC&M agreed that, "if the towns through which the railroad would pass, would grade the road free of cost to the railroad, the BC&M would then lay the iron and operate the road." (And we thought municipally owned airports had a monopoly!) The line was graded, rail was laid, and the grand opening to Lancaster was held in August, 1871. The extension to Groveton was completed the following year. Also, in 1874, the line from Wing Road to Fabyan's was completed, which would eventually include lines to Base Station, Mt. Washington Railway, and branches to Profile House and Bethlehem. In 1879, the control of the Whitefield and Jefferson Railroad was

1. Poor's Manual of 1897 states that the Boston, Concord and Montreal acquired the White Mountains Railroad through lease in 1859, and with it 52 shares of Wells River Bridge Company and 200 shares of Woodsville Aqueduct Company, evidently securing a water supply for locomotives as well as for the community.



New Hampshire Historical Society

A woodburning 4-4-0 and a bright yellow coach lettered "Lake Winnipesaukee, Plymouth & Littleton" pause on the original bridge spanning the Connecticut River between Wells River and Woodsville in a scene from the late 1860's.

assumed. This line would later include a summer branch to Jefferson from Cherry Mountain, and would connect with a number of logging lines of temporary construction.

With the foregoing as a background, it would appear that Woodsville would become the natural terminal through which the traffic, both passenger and freight, would flow, either to and from the south via Plymouth, or to the Connecticut & Passumpsic Rivers Railroad in both directions. Such indeed became fact, for by 1895 all these lines, through leases, had become part of the growing Boston and Maine system. Woodsville was later designated the headquarters of the new White Mountains Division.

With the coming of the railroads, summer visitors were attracted to this area in growing numbers and the B&M actively promoted this trend. Summer hotels appeared in profusion: the *Mount Washington* and the *Mount Pleasant* at Bretton Woods, the *Fabyan House* and *Annex*, the *White Mountain House* just west, the *Twin Mountain House*, the *Waumbek* at Jefferson and others at Jefferson Highlands, the *Mountain View* at Whitefield, the *Profile House*, the *Maplewood*. Bethlehem advertised "Thirty Hotels." Most of them were huge wooden structures with as many as five stories and were lavishly appointed and maintained. Other hotels were located at Sugar Hill, Franconia, Littleton and Lisbon. It was a big list—and big business of its day. A considerable amount of equipment and services were required to provide the railroad's part in catering to this seasonal business. Small enginehouses appeared at Fabyan's, Bethlehem Junction, Whitefield Junction, Lancaster and Berlin, and local passenger trains ran early and often, to say nothing of the through service which was operated to and from New York and Boston.

Nearly all of the periodic locomotive inspections were done at Woodsville, and the twelve-stall house with its related shop facilities was a busy place. A new freight yard was built on the southern end of the Concord line, and the construction of the White Mountain Transfer, a wye track from the Concord main to the Mountain line made it possible for through Boston to Bretton Woods trains to avoid Woodsville entirely. In these early days before division consolidation, Woodsville and Wells River were inseparable. The tracks over the Connecticut River actually formed two wyes, north and south of the station at Wells River. A long passing track ran in back of the station. Trains locally from Woodsville could not be turned, but in the process could meet north and south Connecticut & Passumpsic Division trains, and the exchange of passengers, mail and express was heavy. Thus, train No. 4302, for example, from Berlin, arrived at Woodsville over the Mountain line, dropped local passengers, and passed over the Connecticut River bridge (first a ponderous lattice-span wooden bridge with the railroad above and highway underneath, later replaced by a modern steel structure) over the north wye to clear the passing track, then backed into this track to meet No. 70 from Newport, enroute to White River Jct. Work completed, the train (after assuming a new number) then backed down the "Pompie" line to clear the south wye, and pulled back to Woodsville, now headed in the right direction for Plymouth and Concord.

Two rather separate patterns of passenger service prevailed in summer and in winter. Realistically, summer service operated between mid-June and mid-September, with July and August being the busy months. The lines to Groveton and Berlin kept their service, with some variations, the year round; so, too, was service to and from Concord. Through trains between Boston and Montreal, Nos. 5 and 20 in daytime and Nos. 15


To Newport
GARDNER MT.
N
Montpelier & Wells River R.R.
WELLS RIVER
Connecticut River Bridge Rebuilt 1903-04
North Wye
Old Enginehouse (passenger engines only) Burned May 15, 1907 - not rebuilt.
Wells River Station
South Wye
AMMONOOSUC RIVER
Old Yard
Woodsville Station
Supts. and Disp. Office
Burned April 6, 1921 Rebuilt.
Highland St. Crossing
Coal Shed
MAIN LINE (NORTH)
New Enginehouse (10 stalls, freight engines only). Built 1895. 10 stalls added after old enginehouse burned.
White Mountain Transfer
Highway Bridge
MAIN LINE (NORTH)
Baldwin Siding
Interlocking Tower
"South Yard"
Yard Office
New Yard Built 1895-1896
"North Yard"
MAIN LINE
CONNECTICUT & PASSUMPSIC DIVISION
WHITE MOUNTAINS DIVISION
RIVER
CONNECTICUT
County Poor Farm
Horse Meadow
To White River Jct.
To Plymouth
WOODSVILLE
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Scale 0 ½ 1 Mile
B&M BULLETIN – Drawn by Richard W. Symmes

and 2 at night, were the resplendent trains of the day, and over the years were assigned cars owned by both the Canadian Pacific and the Boston and Maine systems. The day trains (later designated the *Alouette*) rated through coaches, a full Diner and Parlor Observation. The night train (the *Red Wing* in later days) had a full complement of through coaches and sleeping cars to Montreal and a car to Sherbrooke. Summer service from New York to the White Mountain resorts and return included through parlor cars and coaches by day, and sleeping cars and coaches from Philadelphia and New York at night. A through summer train, No. 7, handled through parlor cars and coaches from Boston, via White Mountain Transfer, to Bretton Woods.

With all this variety of passenger equipment in and out of this terminal, let's endeavor to recall the layout of tracks at Woodsville station which allowed for station work and necessary switching and servicing. Fanning out from the Connecticut River bridge were four tracks, the two nearest the station being designated "South Main" and "North Main," the next the "run-around" and the fourth the "Mountain." A set of slip switches were in use just south of the station, permitting trains from the "Mountain" to cross to a nearer station track as required. All switches were handled by switchmen on the ground, and moves were made under their direction. To avoid confusion, all "Mountain" crews received a green signal at night. These same switchmen also controlled the bridge switch affecting the two wyes to Wells River and the gantlet track on the Connecticut River bridge. At Wells River, a switchman or the agent-operator handled their end of the wye switches, the Montpelier & Wells River, and the "five-ball signal." Baldwin's Siding, a long passing siding south of Wells River, enabled C&P Division freights to set out cars for Woodsville and beyond, to be picked up by the Woodsville switcher. A second passing siding north of Wells River, on the west side, could be used for meeting other C&P trains. At Woodsville, movements from the enginehouse to the slip switches east of the passenger station were controlled in the second story of the crossing shanty at Highland Street.

Using a June 15, 1920, B&M timetable as background, let's endeavor to pinpoint some of the highlights which occurred in those hectic days of summer passenger travel. Freight traffic was less hurried and more local in character, but nonetheless important, and was translated into the train dispatchers' headaches of the period. The following list of schedules is representative of the busiest, heavily-traveled summer days as one can imagine.

PASSENGER TRAIN SCHEDULES - WOODSVILLE, N.H. - WELLS RIVER, VT., JUNE, 1920
(Time shown is arriving or leaving time - Woodsville or Wells River)

TRAIN	FROM	TIME	DESTINATION
	Mountain Line - North (Arriving) Woodsville		
414	Groveton	8:17 AM	Wells River
72	Bretton Woods	9:08 AM	New York
4404	Bretton Woods	2:27 PM	Wells River
4412	Bretton Woods	6:30 PM	Wells River
420	Groveton	9:50 PM	Woodsville
76	Bretton Woods	9:17 PM	New York
4414	Bretton Woods	10:00 PM	Wells River
	Concord Line - North (Arriving) Woodsville		
1	Boston	8:20 AM	Bretton Wood
5	Boston	2:05 PM	Montreal
7	Boston (via White Mountain Transfer)	1:58 PM	Bretton Wood
9	Boston	5:25 PM	Woodsville
15	Boston	1:01 AM	Montreal
	Connecticut & Passumpsic Div. - South		
78	Sherbrooke	12:17 AM	New York
70	Newport	8:21 AM	New York
74	Sherbrooke	11:25 AM	New York
752	Newport	6:30 PM	W.R. Jct.
	Connecticut & Passumpsic Div. - North		
751	W.R. Jct.	8:25 AM	Sherbrooke
73	Springfield	2:30 PM	Newport
75	New York	5:30 PM	Sherbrooke
79	New York	1:57 AM	Sherbrooke
71	New York	5:45 AM	Bretton Wood
	Concord Line - Departing		
2	Montreal	1:20 AM	Boston
404	Woodsville	4:50 AM	Boston
14	Woodsville	9:30 AM	Boston
20	Montreal	3:40 PM	Boston
410	Woodsville	4:00 PM	Boston
	Mountain Line - Departing		
4401	New York	5:45 AM	Bretton Wood
1	Boston	8:50 AM	Bretton Wood
423	Wells River	2:50 PM	Groveton
77	New York	4:58 PM	Bretton Wood
425	Wells River	6:05 PM	Groveton

From the preceding list, it can be noted that a number of the White Mountains Division trains from both the Mountain line and the Concord line started from or terminated at Woodsville. To the switching chores involving such trains was added the duty of setting out a Boston sleeper from No. 4414, and later adding it to No. 2 in the early morning hours. Similarly, a Bretton Woods sleeper arrived on No. 15 for transfer to No. 71 about sunrise. Mail and express cars in profusion must have had to be handled plus adding or setting out extra coaches as traffic demanded. While the passenger work near the station was likely the most conspicuous to travelers, the pattern of freight traffic of those days must have been something else again. White Mountains freights from the south, down the long grade from

Glencliff, and powered undoubtedly by 2-6-0 Moguls, hauled into the long siding in the Lower Yard to be flat-switched for destinations such as Berlin or Groveton on the Mountain line, or to points on the C&P Division. In early days, the departure of freight trains out of the Lower Yard, either via White Mountain Transfer, or through the station and to the C&P, was quite an effort. Pictures on record show a pair of 4-4-0's, plus another head-to-head, getting a freight job up out of the yard. In the early twenties it was general practice to make up the through freights for either Concord or the Mountain on the long passing track above the Lower Yard, and for the yard switcher to lend a hand to the yard limits. Cars for interchange with the C&P were frequently handled by switcher down around the South Wye at Wells River to Baldwin's Siding, where a through C&P freight, either from White River Junction or Newport picked them up. Drops from C&P freights were often handled into Woodsville, and dropped just below the station.

The Montpelier and Wells River Railroad operated two passenger trains plus a mixed job which actually terminated or originated at Woodsville, and were turned on the White Mountain Transfer wye. Since the M&WR was controlled by the Boston and Maine, any shipments of granite usually were shipped from Barre via Wells River, and this traffic, in addition to milk which originated from several on-line creameries, added to the work at Woodsville yard. A milk train also originated daily in the north country, with cars from Colebrook over the Maine Central to Coos Junction. At this point, the train became B&M No. 48 and picked up additional cars at Lancaster, Littleton and Lisbon. Upon arrival at Woodsville, it would add C&P cars from Newport, Barton and Orleans, Vermont. Quite a respectable train of twelve to fourteen cars would thus depart for Concord and Boston daily, the empties to return as No. 49 in the wee hours of the morning.

Motive power in this period was most interesting. Engines were assigned to their respective divisions but were borrowed as the traffic demanded. Local passenger trains of four or five cars, usually open platform cars of wooden construction, were generally assigned A-47 4-4-0's 1015-1025, or one of many 2-6-0's, the famous B-15's. Also seen

H. Bentley Crouch Collection

ABOVE: Three trains have converged on the station at Wells River about 1900. At the lower left, the front end of a Montpelier & Wells River engine appears on the north wye. Behind the station, an "up train" from White River Jct. stands on the loop track. A "down train" from Lyndonville is stopped in front of the station. This structure was the third (and final) one to occupy this site. BELOW: The Building at the left was the second depot at Woodsville. The superintendent's and dispatcher's offices were located on the second floor until the fire in 1921. In all likelihood, the building in the background was the original Woodsville depot.



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

Woodsville Public Library

ABOVE: When the Connecticut River bridge was rebuilt in 1903-04, the new bridge was literally built around the old one, with wood members being replaced with steel. BELOW: Engine No. 397 and train cross the new bridge a few years later. The highway used the bottom section of the new bridge until 1923. Note the gauntlet trackage on the bridge.



H. Bentley Crouch Collection

were C-15's 2015-2023 on branchline trains. Pacifics, class P-2, were usually assigned to the through Montreal to Boston sleeper trains 5 and 20, and 2 and 15, as well as the New York trains 71, 72, 76 and 77. Memory is vague on freight power other than the B-15's, which were used between Woodsville and Groveton due to wye and table limitations, but it would appear rather certain that K-7's 2310-2429 were used between Concord and Woodsville, and possibly to Berlin where paper traffic was heavy. K-8 2-8-0 engines 2600-2734 were the heavy freight power of the B&M, and were occasionally seen on Connecticut and Passumpsic freights to and from Newport. Early switchers were G-9 0-6-0's, and are remembered as being numbers 193 and 194. G-10's in the 200 series would come in later years and would be followed by heavier G-11-a (400-series) to handle heavier drags out of the Lower Yard. The M&WR had two 4-4-0's, Nos. 13 and 14, which on occasion could be found handling local passenger trains between Woodsville and Groveton. (The B&M earned an early reputation for borrowing another road's motive power.) Helper service on the Concord Line south as far as Glencliff must have been required, with engines turning on the wye at the summit. A B-15 could handle 570 tons on this line; a K-7 was rated at 750 tons. Based on 30 tons per car in those days, the train limit for one K-7 would be only twenty-five cars.

The first big change to affect Woodsville occurred in 1926 when the Boston and Maine leased the upper end of the old Connecticut and Passumpsic Division, from Newport to Sherbrooke (actually Lennoxville, since the B&M had used trackage rights over the Grand Trunk from Lennoxville to Sherbrooke), 37.1 miles, to the Quebec Central Railway, and the line from Wells River to Newport, 63.7 miles, to the Canadian Pacific Railway. Speculation ran high that the Canadian Pacific was interested in securing a through line to Boston, via Plymouth and Concord, but rumor is all it ever turned out to be, as history proved. The leases, however, did cause a considerable amount of change. The Connecticut River Division now ran all the way from Springfield to White River Junction, to Wells River, Woodsville and to the Mountain terminals above; the line to Concord became a part of the Southern Division. Much the same service prevailed, but passenger trains no longer connected with others at Wells River, and CPR locals now appeared from Newport, operating into Woodsville. CPR G-1 and G-2 Pacifics in the 2200, 2580 and 2590 series appeared with the through Montreal jobs, and freights were handled by D-10's of the 1050-1090 series or by light 2-8-0's in the 3500 series. Most freights continued to run through to White River Junction with the CPR crews and equipment in exchange for B&M crews which ran through to Newport. Local passenger trains now ran between White River Junction and Berlin and, particularly in the morning, passengers traveled to Boston this way. Most freight was diverted via White River Junction, avoiding the hard grades via Plymouth. Very little traffic was generated between Woodsville and Plymouth, and shortly an every-other-day local began handling this work between Plymouth and White River Junction.

History tells us, as in so many other instances, that the automobile and the truck encroached on rail business in the North Country, but the real blow came with the Stock Market crash in 1929 and the depression days of the 1930's. Earlier branch lines discontinued included the line to Jefferson from Cherry Mountain and the Profile branch (both abandoned in 1921) and the Bethlehem branch in 1925. In 1932, changes were more drastic: White Mountains lines from Whitefield Junction to Lancaster and from Wing Road to Fabyan were abandoned and what trains were left now ran over the Maine Central from Waumbek Junction to Coos Junction, and from Whitefield to Fabyan; night trains to New York were reduced to three trips weekly; the *Red Wing*, the night Boston to Montreal sleeper train, was rerouted via White River Junction, combined with the CV-CN night train, thence ran north to the CPR. Motive power requirements were thus greatly reduced, and what power did run that way ran through, requiring little more than a tank of water in Woodsville yard.



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These two views looking south at Highland Street were taken about fifty years apart. ABOVE: The signal tender in the upstairs portion of the diminutive two-story tower operated the ball signal while the crossing tender downstairs operated the gates at the Highland and Mill Street crossings. BELOW: In the fall of 1948, the Groveton local with engine No. 2713 comes off the Mountain Line as it returns to its home terminal. The Concord Line diverges to the right. The tower appears to have been moved back to accommodate track changes.



Philip R. Hastings



Woodsville Public Library

During the early morning hours of May 15, 1907, the original Woodsville enginehouse caught fire. In the excitement of trying to get the 762 out of the house, an employee ran it into the turntable pit instead. Obviously the other six or seven engines in the house didn't make it. The enginehouse was totally destroyed, but the engines were all later rebuilt.



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

H. Bentley Crouch Collection

ABOVE: During the site clearance prior to the construction of the New Yard, a doubleheaded southbound freight with Concord & Montreal No. 106 *Governor Smythe* and an unidentified B&M 4-6-0 collided with a work train. The results were horrendous. BELOW: Extra 402 North gets an assist out of the New Yard by switcher No. 237, circa 1902.



Fenton H. Cooley



Philip R. Hastings

ABOVE: 2-8-0 No. 2662, followed by switcher No. 112, backs the Groveton local out of the North Yard on April 14, 1949. BELOW: A Worcester Salt Special powered by engines No. 149 and 296 (renumbered 937 and 1960, respectively) accelerates out of Woodsville on the Concord line just south of the New Yard in the early part of this century.



Fenton H. Coole

Even the CPR day train, the *Alouette*, with its Canadian power, began running through to Concord and Boston, in keeping with B&M policy to extend locomotive runs and pool power. Gasoline cars in lieu of steam trains made their appearance on the Groveton branch, and the famous "Sacred Cow," an early diesel-powered unit capable of hauling extra coaches, replaced steam on train Nos. 9 and 10 between Woodsville and Concord. Rebuilt 2-10-2's of the 3000 series, with re-aligned springing to distribute the weight more equitably, appeared as 2900's on White River Junction to Berlin freights, further lessening the need for service enroute.

There were bright spots in the passenger picture. Fall foliage trains and weekend specials in the "Snow Country" were actively promoted by the B&M in the early 1930's, and the low weekend rates induced many travelers aboard. One such excursion stands out as a vivid personal memory—a weekend winter excursion from Boston to Lancaster. This train operated via White River Junction to accommodate Dartmouth College skiers, thence north to Woodsville, Littleton, Whitefield and Lancaster. (That's what we thought!) Upon arrival at Woodsville at about 8:15 PM, engine 3689 took water while we waited for DJ-2, the through freight from Berlin. Shortly thereafter, the head-end of DJ-2 appeared, a K-8 leading one of the 2900's and six cars—the rest of their train had derailed up at the end of the White Mountain Transfer! The thermometer read twenty degrees below zero! It took some time to get action started, but some time after 10:00 PM, a CPR 2600 appeared around the North wye, and acted as our pilot from Woodsville to St. Johnsbury. The Maine Central freight crew on train No. 373 had set their train off at Quebec Junction, and returned light, to doublehead as our pilot from St. Johnsbury to Whitefield. There the 3689 took over again with all but the three last coaches, and backed to Wing Road to turn, and continued to Littleton and Lisbon. Meanwhile Maine Central pulp extra 371 had been set out at Coos Junction and had come over light to Whitefield to gather in the remaining travelers. Our arrival at Lancaster in biting cold was likely a first and last to North Country railroading sometime after 5:00 AM!

Round-the-Mountain excursions sponsored by the Railroad Enthusiasts, both as Fall Foliage and mid-winter trips, were very popular, operating both via North Conway, the Maine Central through Crawford Notch to Whitefield, thence to Woodsville, Plymouth and Concord, and on the reverse routing. On at least one occasion there were two trains, one operating each way with a meet at Fabyan. Sixteen cars (including a baggage car and full dinner) required that a helper (often a B-15) be assigned from Woodsville to Ashland ahead of the usual P-3 (3700-3709).

Heavy floods and hurricanes in 1936 and 1938 brought the lines terminating at Woodsville into particular prominence, even though the activity was short-lived. For varying periods, the Merrimac and Connecticut River valleys and the Northern line through Canaan were either under water or washed out, and all traffic, freight and particularly milk, was routed through this terminal. Routes varied from day to day—sometimes via St. Johnsbury and the Maine Central to

Train No. 9 from Concord has just arrived at Woodsville and the BL-2 which powered it has cut off and is backing down to the house for servicing. At the far left, a lady passenger who arrived on No. 9 is being escorted by a Barre & Chelsea conductor to B&C train No. 3, which will leave shortly for Montpelier, June, 1950.

Philip R. Hastings

Maynard S. Nutter

Philip R. Hastings

Canadian Pacific power frequently ran through on B&M lines. ABOVE: CPR 4-6-2 No. 2210, the road engine for the southbound *Alouette*, moves out of the way so that 0-6-0 No. 418 can switch out a head-end car in the summer of 1942. BELOW: A White River Jct. to Newport freight approaches the north end of Baldwin's Siding below Wells River on Sept. 1, 1955.

Portland or North Conway, or north to Whitefield. As lines were opened and water went down, the Concord line was again available, and rusted K-7's which had languished in the Billerica boneyard, reappeared on detoured freights, and the enginehouse took on some of its former glory. Traffic could move via the CPR to Farnham and Delson, thence D&H, and much tonnage moved over this route pending repair of main lines further south. Woodsville would remember her sudden, if temporary, restoration to busy yard activity and countless extra trains for a long time. World War II would bring back some of the heavy activity, but it would not be the same. The B&M continued to try to attract passengers but each summer, service diminished: the *Day White Mountains* train from New York to Bretton Woods (later known as the *North Wind*) disappeared, and a Friday and Sunday sleeper service was about all that remained by 1953.

The year 1953 was a fateful one. We heard the presistent rumor that the portion of the old White Mountain line from Woodsville to Plymouth was up for abandonment. Rumor became fact, and on October 30, 1954, a trip to Woodsville via train No. 5, the *Alouette*, the last one, was made to record the end of an era. Diesels, of course, had long since replaced steam in this part of the system; mute evidence stood out at the enginehouse—all doors were closed except No. 9 stall, which was full of white leghorn chickens. Ties were still in place on the old White Mountain Transfer, but the rails were long gone. Except for odds and ends of work equipment in the old south freight yard, all was deserted. A run-through diesel cleaning shed would get its last work-out on this day. Train No. 20 from Montreal arrived and departed for the last time, headed by a big maroon CPR 1800-series E-8 diesel. Rain, somehow appropriately, began to fall as No. 24, on this night a two car train, (an RPO-baggage combine and a coach) behind E-7 diesel 3813, draped with black crepe, was made ready. At 5:20 PM, under a barrage of torpedoes, we watched Woodsville station recede behind us for the last time; a meet with No. 409 at Oliverian, exchanges of good wishes among the crews, and one more wedge had been driven into the decline of a busy Mountain terminal.

Unhappily, the end of passenger service to Woodsville was not far away. The B&M began purchasing an increasing number of Budd Rail Diesel Cars and during the middle 1950's they were gradually assigned to practically all passenger service. A single Budd *Highliner* became the only "train" between White River Junction and Berlin. This was reduced in 1958 to one round trip daily, and shortly even this service disappeared. Woodsville's train dispatchers and other officers had long since been transferred elsewhere, and the railroad community became one deeply marked with history but little else.

Today, in 1975, even the freight agent has been eliminated, and such business as may be offered is transacted by telephone or via a traveling freight agent from White River Junction. The removal of many crewmen, and the loss of patronage in Woodsville's stores has hurt, tax revenue has diminished, and many oldsters discuss better days when railroading was a principal business in the community. The younger generation scarcely remembers yet many will gain satisfaction in learning of the days when Woodsville was a railroad terminal of prime importance in the North Country.

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Personal recollections of the author.

The Groveton local heads upgrade out of Woodsville in this 1949 photograph by Phillip R. Hastings.

Philip R. Hastings





H. Bentley Crouch

ABOVE: The last run of Sunday-only train No. 4020 from Woodsville to Concord was made on October 24, 1954. All service between Woodsville and Plymouth was discontinued the following Saturday. BELOW: Very little remains today of the New Yard at Woodsville. On April 26, 1968, local freight J-1 hauls two cars of wood chips up from the wood chip plant located at the south end of the former yard. This trackage is now part of the five-mile Blackmount Branch, which is all that remains of the line to Plymouth. Compare this view with the one on page 14.



H. Bentley Crouch

Daniel Willard

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Daniel Willard was a railroad executive best known as the president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) from 1910 to 1941. He served on or headed several government railroad commissions in World War I and appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine in 1932 due to his part in negotiating wage cuts in the Great Depression.

Popularly known as "Uncle Dan," he established the B&O's reputation as a public-minded and innovative railroad. He is also remembered in Baltimore as a trustee (and from 1926 to 1941, chairman of its board) of the Johns Hopkins University.

Willard, Ohio (originally Chicago Junction) was renamed in his honor in 1917.

Daniel Willard

Born	January 28, 1861 Hartland, Vermont
Died	July 6, 1942 (aged 81)

Contents

- 1 Early life
- 2 Railroad management
- 3 Government service
- 4 See also
- 5 References
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Early life

Daniel Willard was born on January 28, 1861 to Mr. & Mrs. Daniel S. Willard in Hartland, Vermont, a small farm village. His mother died when he was five. On his father's side, he was descended from colonist Thomas Hastings who came from the East Anglia region of England to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1634.[1] Willard attended the local high school and teaching at the district school for two years starting at the age of sixteen. He boarded out with Sophie Taylor, one of his teachers, who instilled in him an appreciation of learning. Family finances were slight and he could not attend Dartmouth College as he

desired; instead he attended the Massachusetts Agricultural College at Amherst, Massachusetts in 1878. Poor eyesight, however, forced his departure after six months. This was the end of his formal education. While at Massachusetts he was a member of Phi Sigma Kappa fraternity.[2]

His railroad career began at this time, as a track laborer on the Vermont Central Railroad. In four years he worked his way up the ladder to become a locomotive engineer on the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway. After being laid off from this job in 1884, he moved to the Soo Line, where he eventually became superintendent in 1899. (He had held acting positions for several years prior.) During this period he married Bertha Elkins of Vermont.

Railroad management

In 1899 he followed his mentor, Frederick D. Underwood, to the Baltimore and Ohio for the first time, taking a position as Assistant General Manager. Two years later, he followed Underwood to the Erie Railroad, where he was made assistant to the president. He soon became third vice-president. When first vice-president George Miller Cumming stepped down in January 1903,[3] Willard became first vice-president in his place,[4] and then general manager.[5] In 1904 James J. Hill convinced him to take a position as Vice President in charge of operations on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad. In 1909 he assumed an additional similar position on the Colorado and Southern Railway, and in 1910 assumed the presidency of the B&O, a position that he held for thirty-two years, one of the longest such tenancies in the United States.

Government service

In October 1916, he was appointed a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and the following March chairman of the Commission. After the entrance of the United States into World War I, he was appointed in July 1917 a member of the special committee of the Council of National Defense to secure mediation in case of strikes on war contracts. In November 1917, he was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson to be chairman of the War Industries Board, charged with devising and expediting means of producing the government's industrial requirements for effective warfare. In January 1918, he resigned in order to devote personal attention to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. When the government temporarily nationalized the railroads during the war (*see* United States Railroad Administration), a federal manager displaced him as operating head of the B&O, but he remained president in charge of its corporate affairs.[5]

See also

- List of railroad executives

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1. Willard, J., Walker, C.W., Pope, C.H., Willard Genealogy, Sequel to Willard memoir, Boston: Willard Family Association, 1915, 617-618.
2. Earl F. Schoening, ed. (January 1941). " "Uncle Dan Willard". *The Signet, a magazine for members of Phi Sigma Kappa fraternity*: Vol XXXIII, No.1, pg 44.
3. "G. M. Cumming leaves the Erie," New York Herald, Jan. 25, 1903

WINDSOR STATION, MONTREAL MARCH 17, 1909

The morning of March 17th, 1909 The Boston Express had left Boston the night before had run north on the Boston and Maine Railroad to the Canadian Pacific connection at Newport, Vermont. There CPR engine 902 was put on; and then off the Express went, up Newport hill on the old SER , through Brigham Junction, Farnham, across the Richelieu, St John, Delson, across the St Lawrence River, Montreal West. A spring or spring hanger on the right-hand rear driver of the North British ten-wheeler failed causing the engine to list slightly resulting in the driving wheel tire cutting the head from a staybolt on the boiler. The resulting steam was deflected directly into the cab at the engineman's position; in vain did big engineer Mark Cunningham try to stop the engine, scalding his hands badly in the process. He either jumped or fell from the engine, sustaining injuries that would kill him. The fireman then jumped.

The train continued on it's way toward the station, the train conductor only suspecting something was amiss when the train did not stop at Westmount. The downgrade from Westmount to Windsor Station only served to accelerate the runaway train, which was lined for the southeastern most track in the trainshed.

It is estimated that the train was doing fifty miles per hour when it hit the stop-block, crossed the platform area, and burst through the walls of the station into the waiting room, killing a woman and three children. The engine came to rest in the waiting room, sinking partially through the floor into the basement. The passenger cars telescoped, the baggage car breaking through the south wall of the trainshed and overhanging Donegani Street.

Big Mark Cunningham's body would be sent by special train to a very sad day at Farnham.

Omer Lavallee Canadian Rail Febuary 1964

STEVENS MILLS WRECK AUGUST 16, 1942

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2616

THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY

REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT

NEAR STEVENS MILLS, VT., ON

AUGUST 16, 1942

SUMMARY

Railroad:	Canadian Pacific
Date:	August 16, 1942
Location:	Stevens Mills, Vt.
Kind of accident:	Derailment
Train involved:	Freight
Train number:	903
Engine numbers:	872-1078
Consist:	44 cars, caboose
Speed:	20-25 m. p. h.
Operation:	Timetable and train orders
Track:	Single; tangent; vertical curve
Weather:	Raining
Time:	About 7:20 p. m.
Casualties:	2 killed; 4 injured
Cause:	Accident caused by washout

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2616

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY

October 7, 1942.

Accident near Stevens Mills, Vt., on August 16, 1942,
caused by washout.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION[1]

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On August 16, 1942, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Canadian Pacific Railway near Stevens Mills, Vt., which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of four employees.

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[1]Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



Inv. No. 2616
Canadian Pacific Railway
Stevens Mills, Vt.
August 1912

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Quebec District designated as the Newport Sub-division and extending between Newport, Vt., and Brookport, Quebec, Canada, a distance of 58.4 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. The accident occurred on the main track at a point 2,850 feet north of the station at Stevens Mills. As the point of accident is approached from the south there is a 4°21' curve to the right 997.2 feet in length, which is followed by a tangent 2,563 feet to the point of accident. The grade for north-bound trains varies between 0.44 and 0.91 percent descending throughout a distance of 3,000 feet, and then there is a vertical curve 70 feet to the point of accident and 850 feet beyond.

The track structure consists of 100-pound rail, 39 feet in length, rolled in August, 1939, and laid on 19 ties to the rail length; it is fully tieplated, double-spiked, and is provided with 12 rail anchors per rail length. The track is ballasted with gravel to a depth of 7 inches.

Throughout a distance of about 1,900 feet immediately south of the point of accident, a swamp, which is about 1,900 feet long and 400 feet wide, lies to the west of the track. Water from a range of hills drains into this swamp. At the north end of the swamp, the hillside is at an angle of about 30 degrees to the track, and at a point about 58 feet north of the point of accident it is about 10 feet high and 20 feet horizontally distant from the track. Throughout a distance of about 1,750 feet south of the point of accident and extending to a point about 60 feet north of the point of accident, the track is laid on a fill which averages 7 feet in height and 19 feet in width at the top. Accumulated water drains from the swamp through a masonry culvert which is 6 feet high and 8 feet wide and is located at a point 245 feet south of the point of accident.

Maintenance-of-Way Rules and Instructions read in part as follows:

> 160. The Section Foreman and such of his forces as he considers necessary must take every precaution to prevent accidents during heavy wind, snow or rain storms and freshets or high water, whether by day or by night, and must go over his section to make sure that the track is safe. During heavy rain storms all water ways must be carefully watched.

In the vicinity of the point of accident the maximum authorized speed for freight trains is 40 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

No. 903, a north-bound third-class freight train, consisted of engines 872 and 1078, coupled, 42 loaded and 2 empty cars and a caboose. This train departed from Newport, 27.7 miles south of Stevens Mills, at 6:05 p. m., according to the dispatcher's record of movement of trains, 3 hours 35 minutes late. At North Troy, 13.4 miles south of Stevens Mills and the last open office the crew received a message reading as follows:

> Culvert at Mileage 32 reported washing out. Please approach this point cautiously expecting to be flagged.

This train departed from North Troy at 6:46 p. m., 3 hours 35 minutes late, and at Missisquoi, 1.8 miles south of Stevens Mills, it was flagged by a section foreman. After the crew was warned about flood conditions, the train proceeded at a speed of about 5 miles per hour over the track mentioned in the message. After this section of track had been traversed the speed of the train was gradually increased, and while moving at an estimated speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour the train was derailed at a point 2,850 feet north of the station at Stevens Mills.

Both engines were derailed to the west and stopped, considerably damaged, on their left sides with the front end of the first engine at a point 247 feet north of the point of derailment. The cab of the first engine was demolished. The first 16 cars were derailed and stopped in various positions across the track and on each side of it. Of these cars, 10 were demolished and 6 were badly damaged.

It was raining at the time of the accident, which occurred about 7:20 p. m.

The employees killed were the two firemen. The employees injured were the two engineers, the conductor and the flagman.

Data

After the accident, it was found that 58 feet of track was washed out.

Discussion

No. 903 was moving on tangent track at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour in territory where the maximum authorized speed for freight trains is 40 miles per hour. When this train reached a point 2,850 feet north of the station at Stevens Mills both engines and the first 16 cars were derailed at a washout.

The train was drifting on the descending grade as it was approaching the point where the accident occurred, and all members of the crew on the engines were maintaining a lookout ahead.

The first indication of defective track was when the front end of the first engine dropped down. This engine overturned to the left before any action could be taken to stop the train.

The investigation disclosed that throughout a distance of 58 feet the roadbed was washed out by flood water, and that the west side of the fill had been scoured deeply. Throughout a considerable distance north and south of Stevens Mills rain had fallen during the day of the accident, and about 4:30 p. m., rain of cloud-burst proportions fell. The cloud-burst continued until about 5:25 p. m., and then a heavy rain fell until about 7 p. m. An extra section foreman, who was at a point about 2 miles south of the point of accident but not on duty, became alarmed concerning flood conditions and inspected the track in that vicinity. Because the culverts were filled with water, he talked by telephone with the operator at Richford, 3.3 miles south of Stevens Mills, in regard to the flood conditions. As a result, No. 903 was instructed by message to proceed carefully at Milepost 32, about 1 mile south of Stevens Mills. The extra section foreman flagged No. 903 at Milepost 32, boarded the first engine to inform the engineer of flood conditions, and remained on the engine until it reached a point about 1/2 mile farther north. After the extra section foreman alighted from the engine he observed that the train was being operated under control until it passed from his view. Later, he was informed that No. 903 had been derailed at a washout, and when he arrived at the scene of the accident he found that the roadbed was washed out to a depth of about 3 feet. The rainfall on the day of the accident was heavier than he had previously experienced in that vicinity. The engineer of the first engine said that after the extra section foreman warned him of flood conditions he operated his train at a speed of about 10 miles per hour over the territory where he thought a washout might occur. After his train passed Stevens Mills the track was tangent and there was no indication that high water had caused the track to be defective; therefore, he permitted the speed to increase gradually to about 25 miles per hour. Between points, respectively, 10.9 miles and 4.8 miles south of Stevens Mills heavy rain was encountered, but as his train was approaching Stevens Mills the rainfall had abated considerably. The engineer of the first engine did not know of a washout having occurred previously at the point involved, but the engineer of the second engine said that during 1925 a flood had occurred in that vicinity; however, he did not know if the track had been damaged at that time. The engineer of a north-bound passenger train said that his engine passed over the track involved about 5:30 p. m., and at that time the track was in good condition and the streams were not overflowing their banks.

Under the rules, during storm conditions maintenance-of-way foremen are required to patrol their sections to ascertain if there is any damage and to observe if flood conditions are hazardous. The section foreman assigned to the section involved

said that during the afternoon of the day of the accident, which occurred on Sunday, he was asleep and did not awaken until 4:30 p. m. He immediately proceeded to observe conditions along his section by driving his automobile on a highway paralleling the track. He returned to his home, 3.3 miles north of Stevens Mills, at 5:50 p. m., and at that time there was no indication of defective track. About 7 p. m., after he had received a line-up on No. 903, he and his force proceeded to patrol the track on a handcar. Before he arrived at the point of accident No. 903 had derailed.

The investigation disclosed that the run-off of water from the hills west of the swamp was of such volume that water rose to the level of the ties. Apparently, the opening provided by the culvert located 245 feet south of the washout was not large enough to prevent the water on the west side of the track from rising to a dangerous height. There was no indication that debris had blocked the culvert. The slope of the hillside near the west side of the track caused the water to flow toward the track at a point 58 feet north of the point of accident, and the action of the water scoured the roadbed.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by a washout.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this seventh day of October, 1942.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,

Secretary.


SEP 1942



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

SEP 1942

MONTREAL AND ATLANTIC

The Southeastern built its mainline from Farnham to Newport, Vermont in 1873, and built a network of branch lines. CPR acquired stock control in 1884. It was re-organized as the Montreal and Atlantic in 1891. It kept its own equipment until it was absorbed by Canadian Pacific October 1st, 1931.

4-4-0 ex Southeastern
1-22

4-6-0
24/7200

4-4-0
25-30

4-6-0 D-4 built 1915 to M&A 1924
417, 418, 419, 420, 421

4-6-0 D-10 built 1910
2668/868, 2669/869, 2670/870

4-6-2 G-2 built 1909
1201/1151/2551,1202/1152/2552

0-6-0 U-3 built 1905
2177/6177

The first engines over the Short Line in 1889.

28 4-4-0 Dubs 4-1882 17x24 62"
to C P R 139; 3-1913 to 92, scrapped 9-1930

174 4-4-0 Baldwin 17x24 62"
to C P R 56 4-1906, scrapped 4-1909

360 4-4-0 CPNS 11-1886 17x24 62"
to C P R 205 1-1907, 8-1913 to 17 scrapped 6-1926

Windsor Mills, Quebec -Eastray- North Troy, Vermont

This Canadian Pacific branch line was built as the Orford Mountain Railway over a period of twenty years. Construction started in 1890, reaching Lawrenceville in 1891 and Kingsbury in 1892. In 1904 a line was built south to Potton Township and the following year, by December 1905, had built north to Windsor Mills on the St Francis River. March 1910 the Orford Mountain was leased to the Canadian Pacific. The CPR then built a further south five miles from Mansonville, to just over the border, to North Troy (Elkhurst), Vermont in 1910. This last trackage connected with the CPR's former Southeastern line from Farnham to Newport, Vermont. Very light lumber traffic resulted in the abandoning in sections; April 1936 saw the south portion Eastman to Elkhurst, December 1941 Windsor Mills to Kingsbury, December 1949 Kingsbury to Valcourt. The last portion Valcout to Eastman went April 1965. Only the lightest motive power was used like D-4 4-6-0's or the more famous No. 29 , the preserved CPR 4-4-0.

PASSUMPSIC STATIONS

NEWPORT

ORLEANS

WEST BURKE

FOLSOM

LYNDONVILLE

ST JOHNSBURY

BARNET

EAST RYEGATE

WELLS RIVER

BRADFORD

FAIRLEE

POUPANOOSUC

NORWICH HANOVER

WHITE RIVER JUNCTION

FARNHAM STATION BURNS FEBRUARY 9, 1949

FARNHAM 2-25-1914

LENNOXVILLE 7-2-1914

SHERBROOKE 2-2-1915

12-1-1915

SHERBROOKE 3-18-1916

SCOTSTOWN 12-19-1916

COOKSHIRE 3-17-1917

NEWBURY, VERMONT 11-1-1948

ALOUETTE NAMED 4-25-1926

ALOUETTE OCTOBER 1956 BECOMES RDC

ALOUETTE ENDS 1965

August 28, 1879 The Passumpsic Railway Company are fitting up a fine place for picnic parties at Bay View at the extremity of the Point known as Magoon's nearly opposite Owls Head.

November 20, 1879 The Passumpsic cattle train south on Monday evening over the Bostion Cocord and Montreal Road ran into the rear of the way freight at Centerbury damaging the engine and smashing five or six cars, The train was delayed two and a half hours. No persons were hurt.

February 12, 1880 The Passumpsic is getting a great rush of freight from it's feederes the Massawippi Valley and the Southeastern.

October 21, 1880 There was a collision on the Massawippi Valley RR on Saturday morning the mail train south running into the freight train that had been stuck by being over loaded. A dense fog prevailed at the time. A man sent out to waarn the mail train did not get far enough away from the freight to prevent a collision, but did prevent a serious accident by lessening the speed. The engine of the Mail Train was somewhat damaged but nobody was hurt.

January 13, 1881 Two passenger cars of the mail train south on the Passumpsic Road were capsized at East Coventry, Vermont Friday and Mrs Cushing an old woman was killed and the following were injured; Mrs Epphraim Foster of Barton, J. H. Brown of Barton Landing, Mary Ferguesson of I(nverness. The Mail Train south was thrown from the track one third of a mile north of Coventry station on Friday morning last, and two cars being ditched and all within were more or less injured. The train was running at ordinary speed which at this point is from twenty to thirty miles per hour when t6he engine turned out a rail, T^he engineer Henry Moore reversed steam and applied the brakes.

May 18, 1876 Trains are now running regularly on the Passumpsic Road. The great washout at Passumpsic is in the process of repair and before the week is out there will be no interruption to traffic on the whole line.

The Passumpsic was particularly unfortunate having several washouts between Newport and White River Junction. Regular trains had to suspend travel on Thursday and no mail was received here from Wednesday evening until Sunday morning, and from Montreal-except a little via Coaticook-until Saturday night. There was a serious washout at Barton. At Passsumpsic about two hundred and twenty feet of heavy dump is gone, which will prevent the passage of trains for several days. Thereare several smalller washouts on the same road. At Coventry the track was several feet under water for quite a distance and at Capelton on the Massawippi, the track was also under water. We believe the connection with Sherbrooke was resumed on Saturday. The Connecticut River is reported higher than at any time since the great freshlet of 1851.

June 29, 1876 The Stanstead and Newport Accomdation train will take passengers from Stanstead to Newport and return for a fare of one way. This arrangement will accommodate those wishing to accompany friends to or from the Montreal and Boston Air Line trains or those who may wish to spend a few minutes at Newport. Trains will leave at 4:15 P.M. And remain at Newport fifteen minutes. The Branch train also runs to Newport on Monday morning's to hit the mail train that returns there from Sherbrooke on Saturday mornings.

June 11, 1877 Lucius Robinson Esq. Of Newport Vermont has recently negotiated (probably for the Passumpsic) for the portion of the Montreal Portland and Boston R.R. From West Farnham to the Victoria Bridge (St Kambert) a distance of thirty-two miles. Six miles remains to be built and one hundred and fourty men are now at work upon it and expect to get it finished by the first of August. This will give the Passumpsic and the Southeastern direct communication with Montreal. Without paying heavy tribute to the Vermont Central which controls the road from West Farnham to St John's. The route will be shortetr and more direct than any other when completed.

CANADIAN PACIFIC ENGINES ASSIGNED TO NEWPORT, VERMONT
JULY 31, 1904

4-4-0		Alco	3-1900
298			
0-6-0		Alco	11-1902
2198			

JANUARY 31, 1916

0-6-0	U-3	Alco	1905

JANUARY 31, 1930

4-6-0	D-10	Alco	10-1912
1072, 1075, 1077, 1081, 1082			
4-6-2	G-2	Alco	7-1910
2596, 2597			
2-8-0	M-4	Alco	1904
2-8-0	M-4	Baldwin	1907
3510, 3516, 3517, 3518, 3519, 3520, 3521, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526			
2-8-0	M-4	MLW	1907
0-6-0	U-3	Alco	11-1902
6140, 6141, 6142			

DIESELS

1800-1801	EMD	E-8	1949	A1A-A1A	2500HP
4000-4007	Alco-GE	FA-1	1949	B-B	1500HP
4400-4403	Alco-GE	FB-1	1949	B-B	1500HP
8400-8404	Alco	RS-2	1949	B-B	1600HP
7096-7098	Alco	S-2	1949	B-B	1000HP

1926, a 40,000 gallon water tank was installed at Sutton. The enginehouses at both Sutton and Drummondville had extra stalls added. The Farnham roundhouse was extended, and so was the station at Estray

1928 the railway built a 300 ton concrete coal tower at Newport,
At Richford, a new 200 foot through truss bridge over the Mississquoi River, was necessary that same year to replace the bridge carried away in the November 1927 floods.

1928 saw the installation of electric automatic signal protection at the Sherbrooke Terminal. Some electric switched controlled from the station were also installed.

SUTTON FEBRUARY 13, 1911

CPR brand new Pacific 1199 collided with extra 1688 while it was standing at the Sutton water tank. Nobody was injured. The 1199 had been delivered from Montreal Locomotive Works only days before. It would shortly be renumbered 2599. The 1688 was also an MLW product, but built in 1907 as a M-4 class 2-8-0, and it would be assigned number 3488 next year.

ACTONVALE MAY 19, 1911

A Grand Trunk freight engine running from Richmond, Quebec to Montreal ran into the side of Canadian Pacific extra 1258 at the Actonvale Diamond. The old and light 2-6-0 built in 1888 survived the collision living out it's life at Farnham until 1927. This is on the Drummondville to Foster and Sutton Junction branch line.

COWANSVILLE DECEMBER 23, 1946

Sunday morning, at 11:10 AM just two days before Christmas; the second section of the Montreal to Boston Alouette fast passenger met in a head-on collision with a small one car freight local at Potvin Crossing. The second section was necessary for the CPR were carrying the Ice Capades from Montreal to a Christmas show in Boston. This train had four baggage cars filled with props for the show.

The performers in the first section of the Alouette had just gone through Cowansville ten minutes earlier. The freight was coming down the grade and around the bend. The passenger slowed down first and then the engineer of the freight applied his brakes, as his fireman jumped.

POTVIN CROSSING DECEMBER 23, 1946

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Through passenger service from Montreal to Boston, Massachusetts, operated jointly by the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Boston and Maine Railroad was fully dieselized on Friday, December 2, 1949, when diesel Number 1800 of the CPR took train 212, the "Alouette" to Farnham, Quebec. Regular service with diesel-electric locomotives began on Thursday, december 15, 1949, when CPR E-8 Number 1800 took Train 212 to Boston, while train 211 arrived from Boston in charge of B&M E-7 Number 3819. Trains 213-214 the Newport Local were handled by CPR 8404 an RS-2. Shortly one of the 1800's would also run Montreal to Sherbrooke while holding down the job as spare replacement at Montreal. The Alco FA-1 and FB-1 freight diesels ran from Montreal through Farnham and Newport to Wells River and White River Junction, Vermont with the B&M-CPR through freights. The RS-2's were single units, could not run in multiples ran in a form of pool service with like Boston and Maine RS-2's centered out of Newport.

WRECK DUMMERSTON, VERMONT

SEPTEMBER 10, 1918

TRAIN No. 82 CONSISTED OF BOSTON AND MAINE LOCOMOTIVE 3635 2 BAGGAGE CARS, 1 COMBINATION MAIL AND BAGGAGE CAR, 1 SMOKING CAR AND 2 DAY COACHES AND IT WAS ENROUTE FROM NEWPORT VERMONT TO SPRINGFIELD, MASS. It left Newport at 6:25 a.m.

DUMMERSTON, VT., SEPTEMBER 10, 1918.

February 25, 1919.

On September 10, 1918, there was a read-end collision between a passenger train and a freight train on the Boston & Maine Railroad, at Dummerston, Vt., about 5-1/3 miles north of Brattleboro, Vt., which resulted in the death of 3 passenger and the injury of 25 passengers and 1 employee. The investigation of this accident was conducted jointed by the Bureau of Safety and the Public Service Commission of Vermont; as a result of this investigation the Chief of the Bureau of Safety reports as follows:

The Second District of the Connecticut & Passumpsic Division of the Boston & Maine Railroad a bands between White River Junction Vt., and Springfield, Mass., a distance of 123.18 miles. Between Windsor, Vt., and East Northfield, Mass., the line on which this accident occurred, the track is used jointly by the Boston & Maine and Central Vermont Railroads. It is a signal track line, over which trains are over *** by time table, train orders and an automatic black signal system. The general direction is north and south, the tracks in the vicinity of the accident following the west bank of the Connecticut River.

The signals on *** line are of the two-position, two-one, lower quadrant, normal clear type. Signals are arranged in pairs, the opposing signals being *** about one-half mile apart, with on average distance between *** of signals of a little less than 2 miles, this being the block length for trains waving in the same direction. Preliminary track circuits are used in order to give proper hand-on protection and a signal cannot clear for a following have until the first train has passed the second opposing signal and its preliminary section. Before the distant signal *** can clear, the train must pare still another signal, so that trains running under clear signals are spaced not less than approximately 4 miles apart. On the Boston & Mains Railroad signals are placed about 200 feet into the block, so that the signal goes to stop position before the engine passes it, the "setting point" being indicated by a "block post." Switch indicators are not used, but switch boxed are used to shunt the track circuit at each switch. Rule No 513 requires that a train before passing from aiding to main line must wait a sufficient time after the switch has been tendon to allow a following train to come to a stop before reaching the switch.

Southbound signal 668 is 9,200 feet north of the point of accident and it is 9,250 feet farther to signal ***, which is located about one-half mile mount of *** Station. Signal 652 is about 120 feet south of were the rear and of train No. 12 stood at the time of collision and is *** feet south of the *** switch at Dummerston. From signal *** to signals 629 is a distance of about 11,650 feet and that distance, added to the length of the preliminary section, a total of 13,700 feet, is the distance a train must travel before signal 652 car start to clear.

The signal and trade circuit conditions at Furrier tan siding are such that then the south switch is opened, signal 668, the first automatic signal north of Dummerston station, assumes the stop position. The opening or *** of the south switch had no effect on signal 652. The track circuit is a tended onto the siding as far as the fouling point, about 165 feet north of the switch.

Approach Dummerston from the *** of short cures and tangents, the track *** it's the station being on a tangent. e is a 5 degree curve to the right, 1,500 feet long, followed by a tangent at the d. This 5 degrees curve passes thought a side cut about 70 feet in depth, the or 60 degrees on the right or engineman's side of a southbound train and restri[illegible] his vision t[illegible] 0 feet from the rear of a train standing on the main track after pulling out from passin[illegible]ding through the south switch.

Beginning at block signal No. 668, and proceeding south the grade is slightly descending for a distance of about *** feet, and then there is slight ascending grade extending to Dummerston passenger station, there the grade is practically level: south of the station there is descending grade of .46% to .25% extending to level track south of the south passing track switch where the collision occurred.

Approximately 3/4 of a mile north Dummerston there *** board restricting speed of southbound trains between the slow board and the south switch to 20 mile per hour. In time-table No. 42 there is also a speed restriction of 20 miles an hour at the south switch.

The trains involved in this accident were southbound first-class passenger train No. 82 and southbound *** train extra 6. Under the current time-table train No. 82 is scheduled to be passe at Brattleboro by train No. 98, the "White Mountain Express." However, on account of construction work in Brattleboro yard, the passing point of these trains was changed from Brattleboro to Dummerston by joint special order No. 1, issured by, the Boston & Maine and Central Vermont Railroads August 8, 1918, to become effective August 11, 1918, no supplement to time-table No. 52 being issured. A copy of this joint special order was delivered to the crews of Nos. 82, 98 and extra 6, and at the time of the accident all members of the crews, excepting the fireman of extra 6, were fully cognizant of the fact that the passing point of Nos. 82 and 98 bad been changed from, Brattleboro to Dummerston.

Train No. 82 consisted of locomotive 3635, 2 baggage care, 1 combination mail and baggage car, 1 smoking car and 2 day coaches, in the order named, all the coaches being of wooden construction; it was en route Newport, Vt., to Springfield. Mass., in charge of Conductor Biggins and Engineman Forgette. This left Newport, Vt.. at 6s25 a.m., passed Putney at 1:34 p.m., 5 minutes late, entered the north end of the siding at Dummerston and arrived at the passenger station at 1:41 p.m., 6 minutes late. After receiving and discharging passengers, the train order signal being clear, the train proceeded to south end of the siding to wait for train No. 98 to pass.

approximately 2.59 miles south, and the indication of that signal changed from stop to caution, the brakeman of train No. 82 immediately opened the south switch of Dummerston passing siding and train No. 82 proceeded out upon the main line where it stopped with the rear end of the last coach 89 feet south of the switch points, to wait for the brakeman who closed the switch. About the time the signal changed from stop to caution, the flagman of train No. 82 placed a torpedo on the main track at a point about 965 feet north of on the main line. Immediately after train No. 82 had cleared the rear of train No. 82 where it stopped the siding, the brake closed the switch, and just after the switch was closed, train No. 82 was struck from the rear by extra 6, at about 1:56 or 1:58 p.m.

Local freight train extra 6 consisted of locomotive No. 6, 1 loaded box care 1 empty box car and a coach used as a caboose, in the order named, and was an route from Bellows Falls, Vt., to Brattleboro, Vt., in charge of Conductor Sawin and Engineman Webb. It left Bellows Falls at 12:50 p.m., arrived and took siding at Putney, at 1:20 p.m., to permit trains Nos. 82 and 98 to pass; extra 6 then made a switching movements and left Putney at 1:50 p.m. As extra 6 approached signal 686, the indication of that signal changed from caution to clear. When extra No. 6 passed signal 668, which was also in the clear position, it was traveling at a speed considerably in excess of 20 miles an hour and this rate of speed continued to a point near Dummerston station, where the train slowed down slightly. After passing the station the train picked up speed again, and no reduction was made until the explosion of the torpedo placed by the flagman of train No. 82; the brakes were applied in emergency just before the collision occurred.

The force of the collusion caused coach 665, the second coach from the rear in train No. 82, to telescope coach 702, used as a smoking car, for about two-thirds of its length and the two coaches came to rest with coach 665 slightly above coach 702. Nearly all of the killed and injured were taken from the smoking car. Coach 683, the last coach in train No. 82, was also badly damaged.

Conductor Biggins, of train No. 82, Stated that they pulled into the north end of Dummerston siding, arriving there about 5 minutes late. After stopping at the station the train pulled down to the south end of the siding and waited for No. 98 to pass. After leaving Dummerston station the conductor went into the baggage car and he was there when the collision occurred. After No. 98 passed he looked at his watch and it was about 1:50 p.m.; 3 or 4 minutes later the top arm of signal 652 dropped, the head brakeman then opened the switch and their train immediately proceeded out upon the main line. Then they got out on the main line he looked at his watch and it was 1:56. His train had cleared the switch and had just come to a stop when the collision occurred. He did not hear Extra No. 6 approaching and the first he knew of the accident was the shock of collision. He said they had made this move a number of times and it had been their practice to move out of the siding at soon as the top arm of Signal 652 cleared. He had given hie flagmen no particular instructions, but the flagman's practice had been to place a torpedo on the main track about 500 feet north of the switch, a short distance back of the rear of their train anile standing on the siding, and this he did no the day of the accident. He said he knew the requirements of Rule No. 513; he knew that the throwing of the south switch would set signal 668 at shop and he understood that it would also get signal 652 if train No. 98 had not cleared the block.

Engineman Forgette, of train No. 82, stated that he was substituting for another engineman and that was his first trip on this run. He said they pulled into the north siding at Dummerston, set the switch, then pulled up to the station. He said they were at the station 13 or 14 minutes before they started to pull down to the south end, at 1:40 p.m. When they arrived at the mouth switch they stopped about an length north of the fouling point, to wait for No. 98 to pass. About two minutes after No. 98 passed the hand brakeman walked down to the switch, unlocked it and stood watching signal 652 and when the top arm started to drop the brakeman threw the switch and they started right out. He did not think there was an inteval of more than 2 minutes from the time they started to pull out onto the main line until the collission occurred. In pulling out upon the main line he applied the brakes once to slow up, then released them, and made another application when they were at out; he had not released the brakes when the collision occurred. They had just cleared the switch when the fireman yelled to him and he jumped down from his seat. He did not hear the whistle of Extra, 6 nor the explosion of a torpedo. He did not remember that he had been in Dummerston siding before under similar circumstances, but stated that it was his custom to come out of a siding an moon an the switch was thrown. He said he knew the requirements of Rule 513, but had not considered that the rule applied to their movement at Dummerston; he thought 4 or 5 minutes would have been a sufficient length of time for them to have waited after throwing the switch. He said he did not know that throwing the south switch net signal 668, but thought it set the signal ahead of him and that this was the reason the brakeman did not open the switch earlier.

Fireman Guertin of train No. 82 stated that when they had moved down to the south switch at Dummerston and stopped into clear, the engineman was watching the block, the signal cleared, the brakeman threw the switch and it was about 2 minutes from the time the switch was opened until they were ant on the main line. He was watching for a proceed signal from the rear when he saw Extra 6 coming around the curve and jumped just as his engine was coming to a atop. He heard no torpedo explode.

Brakeman Graves, of train No. 82, stated that after No. 98 passed, at 1:50 p.m., he went back, with flag and torpedoes. and at a point about 500 feet from the switch, two car lengths or more north of the rear of his train an it stood on the siding, he placed a torpedo on the rail. At that time there was no sign of the approach of extra 6 and he than started toward the rear of his train. His train had started to move forward before he reached it and he had to run to catch it. He boarded the train, crossed the rear platform and was Just starting to got off at the switch when he heard the explosion of the torpedo. Looking back, he saw Extra 6 approaching around the curve at a speed he estimated at over 30 miles an hour. He yelled to the head brakeman and they both jumped. While he had not been instructed to do so by the conductor, it had been his practice to protect the movement of his train in pulling out of the siding by placing a torpedo on the main track; each time they had made this move he had put down a torpedo at approximately the same point. On the day of the accident, however, he had extra 6 in mind and thinking they would be through with their station work at Putney, he went up the track farther than usual, going back as far as he could to put down the torpedo and allow himself time to get back to the train and close the switch before the train started. He said he intended to put down two torpedoes, but saw the rear of his train moving and did not think he had time to do so.

Head Brakeman Riley, of train No. 82, stated that when his train stopped at the switch at Dummerston he walked back from the engine and stayed opposite the baggage car until No. 98 passed. When the top arm of signal 652 dropped. after the passage of No. 98, he threw the switch for the main line, but did not give the engineman any signal to proceed; he though they were about 2 minutes in pulling out upon the main line. The rear end of his train had just cleared the switch, he had thrown the handled Over and was just about to drop it into place when he hears the brakeman shout and looking back, saw extra approaching at a speed of 30 or 35 miles an hour; he did not think their speed we reduced much, although steam was apparently shut off. He heard no torpedoes or whistle signal. He said he had been instructed by his engineman and conductor to always wait

Baggageman Hackett, of train No. 82, stated that No. 98 had been by about by about 6 minutes and they were waiting for it to clear the block. The block cleared and after throwing the switch they pulled out on the main line and were almost immediately struck by extra 6. He heard no torpedo nor warning whistle.

Conductor Sawin, of extra 6, stated that he understood No. 98 was to pass No. 82, at Dummerston and assumed that his engineman had the same understanding. He did not look at his watch while at Putney, but asked the operator there regarding these two trains and was informed that both were on time. They departed from Putney at about 1:50 p.m., approximately 7 minutes after No. 98 left. Leaving Putney, as he was entering the caboose, he looked at the signal and noted that it had cleared. He said there was no appreciable reduction of speed at their train approached signal 668 and he did not see that signal as they passed it. Their speed approaching Dummerston station was between 30 and 35 miles as hour; he heard the engineman sound the station whistle and pass the station the engineman slowed down so the conductor could throw off a way-bill there. He estimated they passed the station at about 25 miles an hour and after throwing off the way-bill he went inside the caboose and was making out time reports when the accident occurred. He said they passed, Dummerston at 1:57 p.m.; he did not looks at his watch, but later asked his rear brakeman, who told him. No one called the position of the signals and as the caboose of their train had no cupola, the signals could be observed only by looking out of the window or from the platform and none of the trainman did this. He heard no torpedoes but felt the brakes being applied, followed not more than 20 seconds, afterwards by the shock of collission. The conductor said he did not think they ware traveling, at any excessive rate of speed and he made to effort to check it, as he considered Engineman Webb qualified to regulate the speed. He did not recall the restriction of the speed board located north of Dummerston nor the time-table restriction of speed at the south switch. He said the brakes were all working, as he helped test them and they bed no trouble with them on this trip.

Engineman Webb, of extra 6 stated that after coupling on the train at Putney he applied the brakes. then released then and heard the triple release on the caboose. The next time he had occasion to use the brakes was coming around the curve at Murder Hollow between Putney and Dummerston, then they operated properly, Coming out of Putney and approaching signal 686 he observed that the red arm was down and the yellow arm was up, but the yellow blade started to drop before he passed it. *** fireman called the indication of this signal to him as clear and he acknowledged it. Signal 668 was in the caution position when he first law it, but as they approached the block post the yellow arm started down and had cleared just before lie reached there; after passing the block post and when his engine was about 50 feet distant both arms went up together. *** the signal south of Putney deport to Murder Hollow they did not exceed a speed of 20 miles an hour, but after receiving a clear Indication at signal 669 their speed increased to about 30 or 35 miles an hour and he maintained this speed until he came to the speed board, where he slowed down; he sounded the station whistle signal and after passing the station he increase speed. His train was traveling at a speed of from 25 to 30 miles an hour when, rounding the cure south of the station, at a point about 6 or 7 car lengths from the switch, he ran over a orpede. He immediately closed the throttle but it flew back open and he again closed it; at the same time glancing out the cab window, he saw the rear end of No. 82 and immediately applied the brakes in emergency. but could not stop his train in time to avoid the collission. He stated that his engine brake was in good condition and the train brakes were working satisfactorily. Engineman Webb stated that he was aware the passing point of Nos. 82 and 98 had been changed from Brattleboro to Dummerston; also he was familiar with the speed restriction for freight trains and with the location of the slow beard. He said he had no. 82 in mind, but when he saw signal 668 clear he assumed it was clear he it was No. 82 just leaving the clearing point for block 668. Engineman Webb said he could not deny that he exceeded the speed limit, as he came at a speed faster than that called for.

Fireman Coughlin of extra 6 stated that at Putney the only conversation he had with Engineman Webb was to remark to him that they were waiting for No. 98. He said he usually calls all signals, but as they were leaving Putney he was working on his fire and did not notice the petition of at 686 ver distinctly; he thought it indicated clear and called this indication to hie engineman, who acknowledged it. He got a glimpse of signal 668 as they were approaching it and thought that it also indicated clear and called the indication to the engineman, who waved his hand in acknowledgment. He said he could not state positively about the signal indications. Their speed between Putney and Dummerston was between 30 and 35 miles an hour, but approaching Dummerston station the engineman sounded the whistle, slowed down, and they passed the station at a speed of about 15 or 20 miles an hour, after which speed was again increased to about 35 miles all hour. He got down to put on some coal, heard the whistle, then the engineman called to him to ***. The engineman made an emergency application of the brakes at the same time sounded the whistle and the collision occurred about a half minute after. The fireman did not think the engineman saw the extra more than 30 seconds before the collision and did not think the speed of the train was checked by the brake application. He said the brakes were all right, but the throttle of their engine was not much good and did not hold.

Flagman O'Connor of extra 6 stated that the air brakes were tested at Putney by the conductor, assisted by tale head and middle brakeman and just previous to the collision they took hold in good shape. He estimated their speed from Putney to Dummerston at from 30 to 35 miles an hour. He heard no torpedoes; their speed was about 30 miles an hour when the engineman sounded the whistle and the brakes were applied in emergency.

Read Brakeman Riley of extra 6 stated that he was riding in the caboose and their speed from Putney to Dummerston was 30 or 35 miles an hour. Just after they passed around the curve he heard a torpedo explode, then the brakes were applied in emergency and the collision Followed within half a minute.

Middle Brakeman Jones of extra No. 6 estimated their speed at 30 miles an hour, except passing the station, when the engineman Slowed down. When at a point about 8 telegraph poles from the point of accident he beard a torpedo explode, and estimated their speed when they struck at 25 or 30 miles an hour.

Bridge Foreman St. Croix stated that on the day of the accident he was working on Bridge 60, which is about 200 feet south of signal 668 and was on the east side of the track as extra 6 approached. He said that as the extra came around the curve, which is about 500 or 600 feet from signal 663, the signal was in the stop position and when the train was about at the fouling point the top arm of the signal dropped and then went right up again, while the lower arm stayed up. When the extra passed him it was traveling at a much higher rate of speed than the other trains.

Bridge Carpenters Pennock, Brennan and Hackett corroborated their foreman's testimony and said that extra 6 did not slacken speed as it passed.

accident he was working with three men about half a mile south of the south switch of Dummerston passing siding, right beside signal 647, the northbound signal. He saw the brakeman of train No. 82 set the switch and the train immediately moved out, a little more than 2 minutes from the time No. 98 passed, and came to a stop on the main line with the engine about half way between signal 647 and the south switch. He could near extra *** approaching the other side of Dummerston station and wounded why it did not reduce speed, which he estimated at 30 miles an hour, and the collision followed. He did not remember hearing a whistle sounded, but just an instant before the collision occurred he heard the explosion of a torpedo.

In the investigation of this accident an inspection of all signals involved was made and the relays tested. The switches in the block in which the accident occurred were tested for shunt and found to cut out the track circuit properly. When opened, the mechanisms were found in very good condition and the shunt boxes were clean. The signals worked freely and the clutch coils of signal 668 showed no signs of residual magnetism. The tests made, together with the testimony, justify the conclusion that the signal apparatus was in good working order and did not fail to perform its proper functions at the time of the accident. It is apparent from the evidence in this case that extra 6 passed signal 668 before the south switch of Dummerston siding was opened.

The investigation disclosed a conflict in the testimony regarding the signal indication displayed by signal 668 for Extra 6. The statement of the engineman of that engineman of that train is to the effect that the signal cleared just before his train reached it, and the fireman stated that although he was not certain of the indication displayed he called the signal clear. The members of the bridge gang who were working near were positive in their statements that the top arm of signal 668 cleared as extra 6 approached, and that the signal indicated caution when the train passed the block post. It extra 6 had passed signal 668 after the south switch at Dummerston was opened, that signal would have indicated stop, while if it passed that signal before train No. 98 passed the clearing point for signal 652, signal 668 would indicate caution. In view of the positive and unquestioned evidence that the south switch was opened as soon as the top arm of signal 652 cleared as well as the evidence furnished by members of the bridge gang that signal 668 was in the caution position for extra 6, that train must have passed signal 652, and signal 668 was therefore in the caution position. This conclusion appears to be thoroughly established, Engineman Webb's statement to the contrary notwithstanding.

From tests conducted after the accident, it was found that a train similar to extra 6 on the day of the accident, proceeding at 32.7 miles an hour, could have been brought to a stop within a distance of 600 feet and within 16 seconds after exploding a torpedo placed 965 feet from the rear end of train No. 82 as it stood on the main line. It was also found that, with an engine the same type as was used on extra No. 6 on the day of the accident, looking out of the cab window from the engineman's side, a clear and unobstructed view of the rear of a train as No. 82 steed at the time of accident could be obtained at a point 546 feet north of the point of collision, form which point signal 652 could also be seen distinctly.

The primary cause of this accident was failure of the crew of train No. 82 to wait a sufficient length of time after opening the switch before moving their train from siding to main line, in violation of Rule 513, for which Conductor Briggins and Engineman Forgette are responsible. A contributing cause was the failure of the crew of extra 6 or properly head and comply with signal indications, speed restrictions and torpedo signal, for which Conductor Sawin and Engineman Webb of that train are responsible.

Rule No. 513, of Rules for Government of the Operating Department of this read, reads as follows:

> "Trains about to enter a track protected by block signals, after the switch has been opened which will cause the automatic signal to indicate Stop, will not enter the main truck until sufficient time has elapsed to allow a train, that may have passed or be approaching the signal, to come to a stop before reaching the switch."

In conformity with this rule, it was the duty of the crew of train No. 82 before proceeding out upon the main line to leave the switch open for a sufficient length of time for the extra to have proceeded from signal 668 to the south switch.

The testimony given at the investigation indicates that subsequently to August 11th, up to the day of the accident it has been the practice of the crew of No. 82 to throw the switch and pull out upon the main line the moment the home blade or top arm of signal 652 began to lower, which was clearly in direct conflict with Rule 513. Instead of waiting for the top blade of signal 652 to clear after the passage of No. 98 before the south switch was open, had the south switch been opened as soon as train No. 98 passed, signal 668 would not have cleared and the accident would undoubtedly have been averted; further, after the switch was opened, had train No. 82 waited a sufficient time, as required by rule, the accident would not have occurred. The testimony in this case indicates that it was the practice of the crew in charge of train 82 to disregard this rule, and discloses the necessity for more specific instruction and thorough examination of employee in regard to rules and their duties.

The indication of signal 668, as extra No. 6 passed it, being caution, it was the duty of Engineman Webb to "proceed, prepared to stop at next home signal," according to Rule 501. Signal 652 was only about 120 feet south of the rear of train No. 82 as it stood at the time of the collision, and it is apparent from all the facts and circumstances that had Engineman Webb complied with this rule, he would no doubt have been able to stop his train in time to avoid the collision. An examination of the throttle lever and quadrant subsequent to the accident of disclosed that they were in good condition. It is apparent from the evidence that Engineman Webb not only disregarded the caution indication of signal 668, but failed to regard the speed limit as indicated by the speed board located north of Dummerston failed to comply with special time-table speed restrictions, and failed to act promptly in reducing the speed of his train after exploding the torpedo placed by the flagmen of train No. 82. Conductor Sawin is responsible in that he failed to take any action to cause a reduction in train speed which he knew was in excess of the maximum speed permitted or authorized by rule.

At the investigation it was found that the brakes on extra No. 6 were in good condition and had the rules been complied with by those in charge of this train the collision would have been averted.

Fireman Coughlin is also at fault, on the basis of his own testimony for calling both signals 686 and 668 clear when as he stated he was not certain of the indications of those signals. While it may have been no bearing in this case, such practice is to say the least misleading.

While a contributing cause of this accident was the disregard of the caution indication of signal 668 by engineman Webb, that rule of the Boston & Maine Railroad governing the obervance of the caution indication, reading "Proceed, prepared

WRECK AT SUTTON, QUEBEC JULY, 9 1926

BOSTON AND MAINE ENGINE 2625

CANADIAN PACIFIC ENGINE 3529

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY NEAR SUTTON, VT., ON JULY 9, 1926.

July 26, 1926.

To the Commission:

On July 9, 1926, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Canadian Pacific Railway near Sutton, Vt., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee.

Location and method of operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Lyndonville Subdivision of the Farnham Division of the Quebec District extending between Wells River and Newport, Vt., a distance of 63.7 miles, this being a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The point of accident was 0.85 miles north of Sutton; approaching this point from the south there is a compound curve to the right 1,621 feet in length, varying from 1 degree 6" to 2 degree 8", followed by a tangent 619 feet in length, the derailment occurring 575 feet north of the south end of this tangent. The grade for northbound trains is ascending from Sutton, varying from 0.8 to 1.03 per cent, being at its minimum at the point of accident. In the vicinity of the point of accident the roadbed is a series of cuts and fills, there being a fill varying from 10 to 20 feet in height on the east side of the track at the point where the derailment occurred.

[redacted]eet in length, with an average of 20 to 21 ties to the rail- length, partly tie-[redacted]ed on curves, and was ballasted with from 10 to 12 inches of light gravel. The track [redacted]ell maintai[redacted]

It was raining very hard at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 9.15 p.m.

Description

Northbound freight train No. 903 consisted of 33 cars and a caboose, hauled by B.& M engine 2625 and C.P. engine 3529, and was in charge of Conductor McLean and Enginemen Stevenson and Rickaby. This train left West Burke, Vt., 2.4 miles south of Sutton, upon the arrival of southbound freight train No. 902, and while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 15 to 18 miles an hour it was derailed at a culvert located 0.85 miles north of Sutton.

Engine 3529, which was the second engine, together with its tender and the first car in the train, were derailed; the engine and tender came to rest in an upright position with the front end of tender resting on the engine cab, the rear of the engine having dropped down in a washout about 10 feet. The forward end of the first car was telescoped. None of the other equipment was derailed. The employee killed was the fireman of the second engine.

Summary of evidence.

Engineman Stevenson, who was in charge of the leading engine of train No. 903 at the time of the accident, stated that the heavy rain storm started before his train left West Burke and continued to increase in intensity until after the accident occurred, but that he could see the rails at all times and believed that there was no water over then at the point of accident. The first warning he had of the derailment was when the tender of his engine began to rock; he then attempted to apply the air brakes in emergency, but found they already had been applied due to the parting of the train line between the engines, and on looking back he saw the headlight of the second engine rise into the air. He said he then went back to the second engine but on account of escaping steam he could not get near enough to make a careful inspection of it, but it appeared that the rear end of the engine was about 10 feet below the roadbed while the front end seemed to be higher. He further stated that he had never heard of a previous washout at the point of accident and could not recall having this particular culvert referred to as dangerous during heavy rains.

Fireman Moore, of the leading engine of train No. 903, stated that at the time of the accident the engines separated from each other and the air brakes applied in emergency. He went back to the derailed engine and found two rails extending upward near that engine and a large volume of steam coming out from under the engine. He could not go around to the fireman's side of the engine on account of the water, which was nearly up to the cylinders. He said that during the 10 1/2 years that he had been employed as a fireman he had never experienced any trouble with high water in this vicinity.

Engineman Rickaby, who had charge of the second engine, stated that at the time of the accident his train was running about 15 miles an hour and his first warning of the impending accident was the rocking of his engine which was followed almost immediately by a sudden drop.

The statements of Head Brakeman Lefrance, who was riding on the second engine at the time of the accident, and Conductor McLean and Rear Brakeman Charron, who were riding in the caboose of train No. 903, practically corroborated those of the other members of the crew.

Statement a by members of the crew of southbound train No. 902, which passed over the culvert where the accident occurred at about 8.45 p.m., were to the effect that no water nor any other unusual conditions were observed at this point. The fireman of this train, however, noticed water running along the side of the track at a point 1/4 or 1/4 mile north of the culvert where train No. 903 was derailed, while the engineman noticed water up to the ties on the west side of the track, and the fireman reported the matter to Section Foreman Tyler upon the arrival of his train at West Burke.

Section Foreman Tyler said the fireman of train No. 902 called to him on the arrival of that train at West Burke that the water was over the track north of Sutton. The fireman did not give him the exact location, and as train No. 903 had already started he had no opportunity of giving this information to the crew of that train. He had been in charge of the section where the accident occurred until June 1 of this year, and said he had cleaned out the culvert in question during the spring and had left it in good condition.

Section Foreman Pelow, who has charge of the section on which the accident occurred, stated that he and three of his men were patrolling the section during the rain storm and passed over this culvert at about 7.30 p.m., and while it was raining very hard at that time, yet the water passing through the culvert did not appear to be rising. He said he examined the culvert just before the storm and found it to be in good condition. In his opinion the accident was caused by the water becoming dammed on its course down the hill by brush and waste wood, which was later dislodged by the heavy volume of water behind it and swept down the hill, blocking the culvert.

Sectionman Grondin, who is employed on the section on which the accident occurred, stated that on the morning of July 13 he followed the course of the brook from the right-of-way to the top of the hill and from his examination at that time he was of the opinion that the stream had been dammed in three different places during the storm on July 9 and that these dams were formed of floodwood and brush, which gave way when a heavy volume of water collected behind them, the pressure then sweeping the debris down and blocking the culvert, the water being of sufficient volume to cover the fence on the west side of the right-of-way.

Roadmaster Vallier, who had been in charge of the track in the vicinity of the point of accident for 10 years, stated that he had never known of any trouble at the culvert where the accident occurred and it appeared to him to be of sufficient dimensions to take care of all the water that might flow from this stream.

Examination of the track showed that a section of road bed 37 feet in length had been washed out, the maximum depth of the washout being 6 feet 9 inches, with about 160 cubic yards of material being displaced. The culvert at the point where the road bed was washed out was of stone construction, 3 feet 6 inches in width and 3 feet in height.

This accident was caused by a washout.

In this vicinity there is a large watershed on the west side of the track which extends about 1 mile from the track, and which has a slope of about 25 degree, forming a stream which passes under the track through a culvert known as Culvert 60-1 which was last inspected a short time prior to the accident and was found to be in good condition. Owing to the heavy rain which fell just previous to the time of the accident the stream that runs through this culvert had swollen and it is probable that the water coming down the watershed became dammed with floodwood and other debris, which held back the water until the pressure became too great, and that when these obstructions finally were dislodged the debris blocked the mouth of the culvert, the passing of the train over this culvert causing sufficient vibration to move the earth, which apparently slid cut from under the track while the first engine was passing over it.

All of the employees involved in this accident were experienced men and none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law.

Respectfully submitted,

W. P. Borland,

Director.

WRECK AT NEWBURY VERMONT

OCTOBER 30, 1948

WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 3213

BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT NEAR NEWBURY, VT., ON OCTOBER 30, 1948

Inv-3213

SUMMARY

Railroad:	Boston and Maine		
Date:	October 30, 1948		
Location:	Newbury, Vt.		
Kind of accident:	Head-end collision		
Trains involved:	Passenger	:	Passenger
Train number:	78	:	79
Engine numbers:	3661	:	3646
Consists:	8 cars	:	7 cars
Estimated speeds:	20 m. p. h.	:	20 m. p. h.
Operation:	Timetable, train orders and automatic block-signal system		
Track:	Single; 3 degrees curve; 0.23 percent descending grade southward		
Weather:	Foggy		
Time:	2:30 a.m.		
Casualties:	4 killed; 165 injured		
Cause:	Failure of one of the trains involved to obey a meet order and the automatic block signal		Indication of an

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 3213

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD

January 13, 1949

Accident near Newbury, Vt., on October 30, 1948, caused by failure of one of the trains involved to obey a meet order and the indication of an automatic block signal.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1

PATTERSON Commissioner:

On October 30, 1948, there was a head-end collision between two passenger trains on the Boston and Maine Railroad near Newbury, Vt., which resulted in the death of 4 employees, and the injury of 148 passengers, 6 railway-mail clerks, 8 train-service employees on duty and 3 train-service employees off duty. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a re representative of the Vermont Public Service Commission.

Diagram

Inv. No. 3213 Boston and Maine Railroad Newbury, Vt. October 30, 1948

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

REMEMBER THE GREAT FLOODS OF 1927? THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT A LARGE part of upper New England was struck by rains that wrecked havoc with the railways. The Rutland, Central Vermont, Boston & Maine, Maine Central, Canadian Pacific were among the roads snarled. A fine illustrated article, The Flood of '27, by Patrick E. Purcell, appears in The National Railway Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 6, 1977. From this here's a sample of what happened: "The Canadian Pacific's northbound Alouette, bound from Boston to Montreal, was near the summit in Sutton when Engineer Ernest H. Rickaby felt the tracks 'soften' under his engine and stopped the train. It was to be two days before the tracks were sufficiently repaired to allow the Alouette to be brought down the grade to Barton where it remained nearly a week. Among the passengers was E.W. Beatty, president of the CP, who struck out for Montreal via handcar, jitney, a work train to Sherbrooke and a light engine to his destination."

Canadian Rail
1978



Woodsville

DIESELIZED

DECEMBER 1949

THROUGH C.P.R. - B. & M. PASSENGER SERVICE DIESELIZED

On December 5th, the Canadian Pacific Railway received the first of three 2250 H.P. passenger locomotives from the Electro-Motive Corp. of LaGrange, Ill. These engines numbered 1800-1802, are classified "DPA-22a" by the C.P.R. Nos. 1801 and 1802 were received on December 10th and 11th completing this order.

On Thursday, December 8th, No. 1800 made a test run with a freight train to Farnham and return, and on Friday, the 9th, made its initial run in passenger service on train No. 212, the Boston-bound "Alouette", which included one of the Company's new coaches and the dining car "Bear River". The latter equipment was for the use of press and invited guests on this inaugural run. No. 1800 was removed from this train at Farnham, returning to Montreal in the early afternoon with the special party. The "Alouette" was taken over at Farnham by a Boston & Maine steam locomotive for the run to Boston.

On Friday afternoon, No. 1800 was placed on exhibition in Windsor Station and remained on view during Saturday and Sunday, where it was visited by a considerable number of people.

Regular service was inaugurated on Thursday morning, December 15th, when No. 1800 left on the "Alouette" (train #212). On the same evening, Train #211 arrived from Boston with Boston & Maine engine #3819, a 2000 H.P., Electro-Motive, type E-6 locomotive.

On Monday, December 19th, engine 1802 replaced #8404 (Class DRS-15a) on the Newport local, Trains #213-214, arriving on #213 at noon. No. 8404 had been in this service since September 12th and is now in service between Newport and Wells River. This unit is the only one of the five road switchers equipped with high-speed passenger trucks to relieve the 1800 class.

January 1950

THE JANUARY 1950 ISSUE OF THE ASSOCIATION'S "NEWS REPORT" (EDITOR: E. Allan Toohey; Publisher: R.J.Joedicke) reported that the through passenger service from Montréal to Boston, Massachusetts, USA, operated jointly by the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Boston & Maine Railroad, had been dieselized on Friday, December 2, when diesel locomotive Number 1800 of the CPR took Train 212, the "Alouette" to Farnham, Québec. Regular service with diesel-electric locomotives began on Thursday, December 15, 1949, when CPR E-8 Number 1800 took Train 212 to Boston, while Train 211 arrived from Boston in charge of B&M E-6 Number 3819. Trains 213-214, the "Newport Local" were handled by CPR Number 8404, class DRS-15a.

Our member Rod Peterson of Baltimore, MD, USA, sends us three pictures to remind us of this important transition. In the first of the photographs, CPR engine Number 1802 (EMD E-8), rolls Train 212 south out of Woodsville, New Hampshire, past the B&M engine terminal on April 21, 1951.

In the second picture, MLW FA-1 and FB-1 Numbers 4007 and 4403 rumble across the switches just north of the junction with the B&M at Wells River, Vermont (just across the Connecticut River from Woodsville, New Hampshire) on April 21, 1951.

The last photograph shows CPR engine Number 8403 on the southbound wayfreight at St. Johnsbury, Vermont, on April 21, 1951. Number 8403 was one of five 1500 hp ALCO RS 2 units (Numbers 8400-8404) built in Schenectady, NY. Number 8404 made its first trip from Montréal to Newport, Vermont, on Train 214 of September 15, 1949. In Mr. Peterson's picture of Number 8403, 0-6-0 steam locomotive Number 27 of the St. Johnsbury & Lake Champlain Railroad can be seen switching in the background.

Mr. Peterson's kind cooperation in sending in these photographs is very much appreciated.





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

Boston & Maine Railroad ... Follow

Wreck of the "Red Wing" at Nashua, N.H., Nov. 12, 1954

B&M No. 3820 after the wreck. Dana D. Goodwin photo, neg. no. F181A, album 60. Digital image made from photograph in Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Archives. Copyright Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society, Inc. Learn more about the B&MRRHS at www.bmrrhs.org. Photo 416

Michael Peverett and michael_m_rubino faved this

Add a comment

1,554 views 2 faves 0 comments

Taken on November 12, 1954

This photo is in 3 albums

Named Trains
17 items

Diesel
132 items

Wrecks and Storms
26 items

Tags BETA

monochrome

blackandwhite

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Viewing this photo Public

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

Boston & Maine Railroad ...

Follow

Wreck of the "Red Wing" at Nashua, N.H., Nov. 12, 1954

Canadian Pacific observation car Cape George. Dana D. Goodwin photo, neg. no. F170A, album 60. Digital image made from photograph in Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Archives. Copyright Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society, Inc. Learn more about the B&MRRHS at www.bmrrhs.org. Photo 418

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Canadian Pacific Railway
2 items

Named Trains
17 items

Wrecks and Storms
26 items

Canadian Pacific equipment in B&M territory
1 item

Tags BETA

blackandwhite
monochrome
train
vehicle
sport
railroad
railroad track
outdoor

Additional info

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

Boston & Maine Railroad ...

Follow

Wreck of the "Red Wing" at Nashua, N.H., Nov. 12, 1954

Express car on its side. Dana D. Goodwin photo, neg. no. F176A, album 60. Digital image made from photograph in Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Archives. Copyright Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society, Inc. Learn more about the B&MRRHS at www.bmrrhs.org. Photo 417

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This photo is in 2 albums

Named Trains
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coltrans2002 8mo
The car on its side is B&M 3213, which ended up being scrapped. To the right on its roof is B&M RPO-Baggage 3100 which was rebuilt as B&M baggage car 3291.
Tom E Thompson

Add a comment

Tags BETA

blackandwhite
monochrome vehicle
train outdoor
locomotive railroad

Additional info

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

Boston & Maine Railroad ... Follow

Wreck of the "Red Wing" at Nashua, N.H., Nov. 12, 1954

Dana D. Goodwin photo, neg. no. F188A. Album 60. Digital image made from photograph in Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Archives. Copyright Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society, Inc. Learn more about the B&MRRHS at www.bmrrhs.org. Photo 414

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Wrecks and Storms
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From right to left we have CP Lwt Coach #2173, then B&M-owned Pullman 12-2 Sleeper BUTLER UNIVERSITY, and finally CP Buffet-Compartment-Solarium Observation Sleeper CAPE GEORGE.
Tom E Thompson

Add a comment

Tags BETA

monochrome blackandwhite outdoor vehicle train

Additional info

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OLD TIME TRAINS

B&M CPR Pool

Montreal-Boston was an early run-through with Boston & Maine over a 339 mile route. The pooling of rolling stock began in 1887 with creation of the Montreal and Boston Air Line, (renamed in 1903 as simply, **Montreal and Boston Line** at which time a new fleet of equipment was acquired), similar to the **Toronto, Hamilton and Buffalo Line**. Under these arrangements equipment was jointly owned by the two or three railways operating the service.

Steam engines pooled included CPR G1 and G2 class *Pacifics* and B&M P2 *Pacifics*.

Day trains ***The Alouette*** and night trains *The Red Wing* were part of this pool.



CP 1801 in original paint scheme. Looks like a 1949 or newer Chevy coupe and a much **older truck** on platform. No caption (believed to be Laconia, New Hampshire) or date on this *R.Lewis* photograph. Digital restoration *Ron Visockis.*

OLD TIME TRAINS

The Alouette

Montreal-Boston

The CPR/B&M joint Montreal-Boston day *Alouettes* and overnight *Red Wings* both originally used the Boston & Maine White Mountains Division from Wells River, Vermont via Woodville-Plymouth-Laconia and Concord to Boston. This was changed by 1932 to operate the *Red Wing* down the Passumpsic Division (the original name of the Connecticut River Valley line between Wells River and White River Junction, Vermont. Thence via the New Hampshire Division White River Junction-Concord and on to Boston). *The Allouette* continued to operate on the Plymouth branch from Wells River Vt/Woodsville NH to Boston until October 30, 1954. The line was severed as a through route with abandonment October 31, 1954 of 37 miles between Blackmount and Plymouth. Afterwards, *The Alouette* shifted to operate up and down the Connecticut River line from Wells River to White River Junction instead of cutting the corner and going south-east on the Plymouth branch. B&M assigned their P2 class Pacifics to these trains.



G1 2203 in Boston 1940. *Ken MacDonald/Joseph Testagrose Collection*

Note: In the 1950's this engine would be assigned to Lambton.



2210 *The Alouette* northbound at Laconia, NH 10/1945
Ken MacDonald/Joseph Testagrose Collection

The GPEX milk tank car on the headhead is an empty on its way back to White Bros. in Vermont. This dairy only leased two cars so the B&M expedited the return of their empty each day in order to make the turnaround. This is followed by a B&M mail (15' apartment)-express combine, a CPR baggage-smoker, a coach (possibly a B&M 'American Flyer' lightweight car on this date although CPR heavyweight cars were perhaps more common), and of course the signature CPR buffet-parlor-observation car. A classic consist of this train at the time. *John Horvath*



2218 with the *Alouette* leaving Montreal West. 1947 *E.A.Toohey/CRHA Archives*

OLD TIME TRAINS

Boston and Maine

B&M 3807 EMD E-7 with *The Alouette* leaving Windsor Station in Montreal in the fall of 1949.
Canadian Pacific Archives

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

Boston & Maine Railroad ... Follow

B&M/CP Boston-Montreal train "Alouette" in motion at Woodsville, N.H., Sep. 18, 1938

B&M caboose no.104248 sits on an adjacent track.

R. Gerstley photo. Digital image made from photograph in Harry A. Frye Collection, Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society Archives. Cat. No. 2001.21.13. Copyright Boston & Maine Railroad Historical Society, Inc.

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Taken on September 18, 1938

This photo is in 4 albums

- Yards, 16 items
- Named Trains, 17 items
- Cars - Cabooses, 21 items
- Bridges and Tunnels, 42 items

Tags BETA

bm caboose bridge bostonmaine bostonandmaine railroad steamloco steamlocomotive steam monochrome blackandwhite vehicle train outdoor locomotive

Additional info

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1802 with the *Red Wing* at Montreal West. June 24/1959 *Bob Krone*



1801 in original paint scheme. Compare to 1802 above. B&M 1262



Cape Churchill on *The Red Wing* at B&M North Station, Boston. June 6, 1954
Lawson Hill/John Hutchins Collection



CPR bought three EMD E8 units to pool with B&M E7 diesels. **B&M photos wanted**
First to depart Windsor Station in Montreal was 1800 on this train on December 9,1949.
These were the only E units owned by any Canadian railway.

The Alouette was changed to Budd Cars (RDC's) in October of 1956.

RDC_2 CP 9113 (with another RDC-2 likely a B&M *Highliner*) leads *The Alouette* stopping at Cowansville, Quebec not long after conversion to self-propelled equipment. The two uniformed men are likley Canada Customs and Canada Immigration officers about to board the train to do their duty. 1/12/1957 *L.B.Chapman Collection*



Two RDC-2's comprise Number 32 *The Alouette* seen here leaving Windsor Station in Montreal. The lead car is a B&M and the trailing car is CP 9111. 4/10/1958 *L.B.Chapman Collection*



9113 *Dayliner* meets B&M *Highliner* to exchange passengers at White River Jct. Vermont. Run through of cars has ended due to lower ridership. *Joseph Testagrose Collection*

The last run of *The Red Wing* was made on October 24, 1959.

The last run of *The Alouette* was made on October 30, 1965 using a single RDC.
Since April 25, 1965 the train had been operating only between Montreal and Wells River VT.

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2001-2002

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY News

Canadian Pacific Railway Employee Communications
Room 500 401-9th Ave S.W. Calgary AB T2P 4Z4

VOLUME THIRTY-TWO NUMBER THREE 2002

CPR's First Diesel Passenger Locomotives

Jonathan B. Hanna
Corporate Historian
Communications & Public Affairs
Canadian Pacific Railway

By 1949, CPR was well aware of the advantages of diesel-electric power. Internal combustion had proven itself in two CPR arenas - yard switching and road freight service. Passenger service was the last holdout.

When CPR replaced the 41 steam locomotives that handled passenger and freight from Montreal to Wells River, Vermont, it took only 23 diesel-electric locomotives - three of them exclusively for passenger service - to do the job. The passenger locomotives would be used on the Boston-Montreal trains - "The Alouette" and "The Red Wing". CPR ran these trains in conjunction with the Boston and Maine Railroad (B&M). "The Alouette", the day train, would use a run-through CPR locomotive on alternate days opposite a B&M locomotive. "The Red Wing", the night train, would use CPR power only between Montreal and Woodsville, Vt. But the B&M/CPR service had to dovetail. So CPR ordered the same type of higher-horsepower passenger locomotive as B&M to enable it to pull and heat the trains with a single locomotive. The passenger locomotives B&M used on the service were General Motors' E7 models, developing 2,000 horsepower.

When CPR came knocking on GM's door with a three-locomotive order, GM's Electro-Motive Division (EMD) was already 12 years into production of its E-type locomotive. In 1937, by the time CPR got its very first diesel-electric locomotive to test in yard service, GM was outshopping its EA, E1, and E2 passenger locomotive models. By 1949, EMD was already up to its E7 model (without even skipping a model number). By the time CPR's locomotives went into production, GM had just introduced the E8 model. So CPR's locomotives came out of the La Grange, Illinois, plant as E8A models with their new 567B engines, developing a higher 2,250 horsepower.

When the very first CPR E8A locomotive - No. 1800 - was delivered, 2 December 1949, GM's Canadian locomotive plant in London, Ontario, was still eight months away from opening. So the three E8A locomotives - CP 1800 to 1802 - ended up coming from GM's EMD plant in La

Grange.

In 1949, CPR's new passenger locomotives were the longest, sleekest, most powerful locomotives in the company's growing diesel-electric fleet. Their 70-foot streamlined body housed not one but two 12-cylinder engines, and two steam generators to heat longer trains with a single locomotive. The long body, two engines and steam generators needed six axles, instead of four, to carry the load. Although two of the axles, one on each truck, were dummies and not powered.

Their appearance set these three locomotives apart from the rest of the CPR fleet.

EMD not only prided itself on its streamlined locomotive designs, but on its paint schemes too. La Grange had a whole graphics department devoted to developing passenger paint schemes for their passenger locomotives. And in the halcyon days of diesel passenger service in North America, there were many railways ordering GM locomotives.

The La Grange graphics group designed a unique rendition of CPR's maroon-and-grey-with-yellow-stripes passenger paint scheme. The colours were the same on CPR's existing passenger steam locomotives. They were also the same colours as on the 1949 Schenectady-built Alco FA diesel locomotives used on CPR's Vermont line. But the rendition was different. The maroon - or tuscan red - was applied in a solid block right up to the side grilles on either side, coming to a triangular point toward the top of the nose. The large tuscan red panels were reigned in by yellow stripes. No disrespect to GM's graphic gurus, but CPR's draftsmen would soon redesign the paint scheme to look more like the Alco FA livery.

The E8A locomotives were the first CPR passenger locomotives to get the new beaver crest without the "Spans the World" slogan.

CPR's E8A locomotives started on the Montreal-Boston run. After 1959, they were assigned to the Toronto-Windsor run. By the mid-1960's they were running out of Montreal to either Ottawa or Quebec City. It was on its way to Quebec City, 28 December 1968, that No. 1801 collided head-on with a westbound freight near Lachevrotiere, Quebec. It was scrapped the following year. No. 1800 and No. 1802 were placed in service on "The Atlantic Limited" Montreal-St. John, New Brunswick, run in 1971. In 1973, the two remaining E8A locomotives got a full overhaul at Calgary's Ogden Shops, complete with new paint job. The two locomotives were painted in the CP Rail action red paint scheme of the day, complete with "multimark".

On 28 September 1978, Canada's new rail passenger crown corporation - VIA Rail Canada - bought the two remaining E8A locomotives along with 26 other CPR passenger locomotives. VIA Rail had the two E8A locomotives overhauled and repainted in VIA livery at CPR's Angus Shops in Montreal. Continuing CPR's policy, the locomotives' engines were upgraded to 567BC specifications, developing 2,500 horsepower. No. 1800 got the treatment in October 1979 and No. 1802 in February 1980. In June 1980, while at CPR's Alyth Diesel Shop in Calgary, VIA 1800 became VIA 1899. Both locomotives saw frequent service on the former CPR transcontinental - "The Canadian". A change being as good as a rest, the locomotives were re-classified GPA-25a and re-numbered VIA 6598 and 6599. But in 1982, both were retired at Ogden shops, cannibalized for components and parts, and eventually scrapped.

Vital Statistics

Numbers	1800-1802
Class	DPA-22a
Builder	General Motors EMD

Outshopped	2 December 1949
Builder's Model	E8A
Horsepower	2,250
Cylinders	24
Axles	6
Maximum speed	85 mph (137 kph)
Length	70 ft. - 3 in. (21.4 m)
Width	10 ft. - 8 in. (3.25 m)
Height	14 ft. - 10.5 in. (4.5 m)
Weight	330,500 lbs. (149,915 kg)
Sold	28 September 1978

following equipment:

- Boston - Montreal via St. Johnsbury: 4DB-1CPT-lounge-buffet; 12 sect-2DB
- Boston - Montreal via Montpelier: 12 sect-2DB

Into the Fall of 1954, the *Alouette* ran via Concord, Plymouth and Woodsville NH over the former Boston, Concord & Montreal line. The *Red Wing* sometimes took this route, but often was routed via White River Jct. so it could exchange cars with other trains. After the line between Plymouth and Woodsville was abandoned, trains to and from the CPR were re-routed via the former Northern RR. from Concord NH to White River Jct. and North along the Connecticut River. In the steam era, B&M and CPR 4-6-2s were pooled through from Boston to Montreal at times. Later the Canadian Pacific's only three E-8 passenger diesels were purchased in 1949 to pool with B&M E-7s through from Boston to Montreal.

Summer-Only Luxury Trains to Maine

The *Bar Harbor Express* name was applied to various heavyweight overnight schedules to Ellsworth and Bangor from before WWI to the end of service - Kratville's *Steam, Steel and Limiteds* is a good starting point for the pre-war versions. In some seasons it ran weekends only, sometimes Monday-Wednesday-Friday eastbound and Tuesday-Thursday-Saturday westbound, with an all-Pullman consist. The *Bar Harbor Express* last ran in the Summer of 1960, only as far as Bangor. Because it was a night train, I haven't seen enough photos to supplement the basic info from the Official Guide (July 1952 given here):

- Washington - Ellsworth: 10 sect-1DR-2CPT
- Philadelphia - Ellsworth: 6CPT-3DR; 8 sect-buffet-lounge; 13 double bedroom; 10 sect-1DR-2CPT (Fri. only)
- Philadelphia - Portland: 12 roomette-3DB-2 single bedroom
- Philadelphia - Rockland, ME: 10 sect-1DR-2CPT
- Philadelphia - Plymouth, NH: 10 sect-1DR-2CPT (Fri. only)
- Philadelphia - New Haven: diner
- Portland - Rockland: diner
- Portland - Ellsworth: diner

The diners North of Portland are a bit curious, as it appears that the Maine Central had sold its P-S lightweight diners in 1951, which I've associated with the end of all meal service on the MEC. Possibly these diners were rented from another railroad for this train only; traditionally the railroads serving Florida had an equipment surplus during the *Bar Harbor Express* season.

The train name *East Wind* was first used in 1940 for a new day-coach service from Washington DC to Portland (with some cars through to Bangor). The 700 mile trip took about 14 hours each way, with minimal stops, and used the New Haven's Norwich & Worcester line throughout it's existence to save time (by 1952 the *State of Maine* had been re-routed via Providence).

For the summer seasons of 1940, 1941 and 1942 two dedicated consists were specially painted with lemon yellow sides and a silver window band and pinstripes. The IHC HO scale *East Wind* consist has the right paint on the wrong cars, but most of the correct consist is now achievable with some effort: NH arch-roof baggage, PRR modernized P-70s, NH American Flyer grill car, and NH (skirted) and B&M (unskirted) American Flyer coaches . The leased ACL diners require kitbashing skills, and I have seen very little information on the PRR lounge cars. An article on the *East Wind* appeared in the *Summer 1978 B&M Bulletin* and various of the color photo books have pictures of the consist.

The *East Wind* was suspended from 1943 till 1946, and then ran most years until 1955. The post-war

point was more likely to be Berlin or perhaps Newport, VT on the CPR. Equipment I see in photos is a mix of B&M and NH high-window coaches until the American Flyer cars arrived. Consists got changed and rearranged a lot at Springfield and White River. Food and first class service on the day trains was likely to be limited to a broiler-buffet-lounge North of Springfield, but the New Haven often added full parlors and diners for the NYC - Springfield segment. Some of these trains also carried cars for Montreal via CV or CPR, and exchanged equipment with Boston trains at White River Jct.. By 1957, everyone had to change at White River for the RDCs that served the North Country branches.

The only formal power pooling on these trains was done by the B&M and CV, and that only south of White River Jct. (at least post-WWII). The route from there to Brattleboro was shared track, and though the locomotive usually was B&M, it wasn't always, in either the steam or diesel eras.

Car assignments from the June 1952, *Official Guide* :

Night White Mountains

- NYC (GCT) - Bretton Woods/Fabyan: 10S-1DR-2CP; 14R-4DB (NH lightweight); 6CP-buffet-lounge; 14 single-bedroom
- NYC (GCT) - Woodsville: 10S-1DR-2CPT
- Washington - Bretton Woods/Fabyan: 6S-6DB

Montrealer

- Washington - Montreal: 8 sect-5 double-bedroom; 5 cpt-buffet-lounge
- NYC (Penn) - White River Jct.: 10 section-1DR-2cpt (ex. Saturday)
- NYC (Penn) - St. Albans: 10 section-3 double-bedroom
- NYC (Penn) - Montreal: 8 section-5 double-bedroom; 14 single-bedroom
- Washington - Springfield: Parlor car w/drawing room (ex. Saturday)
- NYC (Penn) - Washington: Parlor car w/buffet-lounge
- Washington - NYC (Penn): dining car

Boston - Montreal via Central Vermont

Boston to Montreal via the CV vanished quickly as traffic started to erode in the 1950s: the original named day train was the *Ambassador*, which by 1952 was being heavily switched at White River Junction, and carried quite a few New York cars north of that point - a few years later the name was applied to NYC - Montreal service only. B&M RDCs ran through to Montreal in 1958, just before the through operation was discontinued. Likewise, the overnight *New Englander* was running combined with the *Alouette* as far as White River Jct., and didn't even warrant its own timetable in the *Official Guide* . The single sleeper it carried is documented under the *Alouette* (see below).

Boston - Montreal via Canadian Pacific

The *Alouette* was the day train, though the name disappeared when the equipment was changed to pooled B&M and CPR RDCs in October 1956. In this form it survived until 1965, with CPR usually supplying RDC-2s rebuilt with lunch counters. The *Red Wing* remained a conventional train with sleepers until its discontinuance in October, 1959. During the 1950s, it appears that the B&M usually supplied coaches, the CPR providing sleepers, baggage-smokers and the *Alouette's* buffet-parlor-observation. The 1952 *Red Wing* was combined with the *New Englander* (the CV train) Boston to White River, and carried the

BUDD RAIL DIESEL CARS

1956-1965

✠ Canadian Pacific Railway inaugurated two more "Dayliner" services during October. One of these involves trains 702, 706 and 707 between Toronto and Owen Sound. The other is the "Alouette", trains 211 and 212 (B&M 307-332) between Montreal and Boston. The latter marks the first time that RDC units have operated in interchange service. The first runs were made by C.P.R. #9111 southbound, and Boston & Maine #6212 northbound. Both of these are of the RDC2 type. Both cars appeared to be very crowded when passing Montreal West. This marks the end of parlour car (and buffet) service between the two cities. Running time between Montreal and Boston has been shortened to 8 hours, 35 minutes, while that between Toronto and Owen Sound is now 3 hours and 15-20 minutes.

November
1956

Canadian Rail

Canadian Pacific

The divergent attitude of the two companies immediately became appatent in plans for the Montreal-Toronto service. Canadian Pacific discontinued its overnight trains Nos.21-22 and began an afternoon service, using stainless steel equipment and dome cars taking 5 hours 45 minutes for the trip with intermediate passenger stops at Montreal West,Smiths Falls and Leaside. Fares were increased, and are from 90 cents to $1.50 more than CNR fares on the same days. No.21 is called the "Royal York" while 22 bears the name of CP's uncompleted Montreal hotel, "Le Chateau Champlain".

On the Ottawa-Toronto line CPR removed its overnight pool trains 33 and 34, via Peterborough, and replaced them with morning "Dayliners" over the same route with the same numbers. An afternoon service is provided by "Dayliners" 261-262 which connect with the new 21 and 22 at Smiths Falls. Service between Smiths Falls and Brockville is not shown in the public timetables, but trains continue to run as Passenger Extras. No convenient connection exists between Kingston and Ottawa. Trains No. 33 and 34 replace former trains 380 and 383 between Toronto and Peterborough. There is thus a net decrease of one train each way between Toronto and Ottawa, and one train between Toronto and Peterbrough.

While on the subject of CPR service cuts, a few others were made outside the former pool territory. Trains 31 and 32, the "Alouette" made their last runs between Montreal and Newport, Vt., September 20th, while trains 217-218 ended service between Farnham and Sutton,Que., ten days earlier. July 19 was the last date for passenger service between Newport and Wells River, Vt. On the Montreal-Ottawa line, No. 232 was combined with No.4 on Sept.7th. No. 235 survived as an RDC train until the change of time, when No.3 was given an earlier departure time from Montreal. There are thus only 5 CPR trains between Montreal and Ottawa. Local trains 213-214 between Montreal and Farnham were discontinued on Saturdays and train 204, Montreal-Sherbrooke on Saturday was replaced by train 206.

There are now only 28 trains arriving at and leaving Windsor Station, Montreal (on a 5-days-a-week basis).

Trains 3, 4, 13, and 14, "The Dominion" are still shown in the timetables with sleepers Montreal & Toronto to Sudbury and Ft.William-Winnipeg, and with the CPR's only remaining standard parlor cars between Montreal and Ottawa, but the continued operation is dependent upon a decision of the Board of Transport Commissioners. Meanwhile trains 1 and 2 have had more intermediate stops added and their times lengthened by 90 minutes westbound and 70 minutes eastbound. (Diesel units 1421-1432 are being re-converted for freight service).

Canadian Rail No 171 1965




LADY LAKE

UNDHOUSE—1867 VARIETY

ight is pictured the first round-
se at Lyndonville, Vt., which was
ted at the same time as the rail-
shops in 1867. The old photo-
h was submitted by R. K. Pierce,
. Signal Foreman, Lyndonville.
Pierce's grandfather helped build
the roundhouse and the shops.
an interesting reminder of the
ys—particularly with the grad-
ssing of steam locomotive
. The roundhouse held twenty-
engines and the turntable was
ted in the centre of the interior
he building. Unfortunately names
iose appearing in the picture were
supplied.



October 1949
Spanner

FREIGHT TRAIN IN COLLISION AT WATERLOO

1943

Waterloo, July 23.—Two engines were badly damaged but no one was hurt in a head-on collision which involved a doubleheader freight and a shunter in the yard at Waterloo yesterday afternoon. The freight, which wah heavily loaded with coal, was coming into the yard at quite a clip, when it struck the shunter and the impact from the collision could be heard all over the town. No one was hurt in the crash, the engine crews managing to get out before the collision occurred.

It is reported that no cars were derailed in the head-on smash but the two engines were badly damaged and officials do not expect to have the line cleared much before late this afternoon. The exact cause of the accident has not as yet been determined, but an investigation is being conducted.

The crews in the accident were Engineers J. Hunter, W. E. Lasnier and D. R. Ball and Firemen Y. Dubois, C. Inglis and E. Foster.

The wrecking crew from Sherbrooke is working on the engines and it is expected that they will be ready to return some time this evening.

July 23, 1943

Diagramme des Installations fixes standard du CP

(Gracieuseté: Archives du Canadien Pacifique à Montréal)

Traduction LRM

ABRI SEMI-FERMÉ N° 3



Au Québec, les réseaux ferroviaires devaient desservir de nombreuses petites localités peu distantes les unes des autres. Il était souvent trop coûteux d'y construire des gares conventionnelles, c'est pourquoi de nombreux abris (*flag stops* ou *shelters*) parsemaient la campagne. L'abri de Ste-Brigide près de Farnham, photographié ici en juillet 1914, est un exemple classique. La longue plate-forme servait davantage aux marchandises: bidons de lait, sacs de grains, etc., qu'aux voyageurs.

Le panneau indicateur de passage à niveau, le tonneau de bois et le sémaphore d'arrêt sont des détails intéressants à noter. On peut même rendre le bras mobile par un simple dispositif le reliant par fil à une manette de commande.

De tels abris sont tout indiqués sur nos réseaux miniatures, là où un arrêt est prévu bien que l'espace soit restreint. ■

MATT 4/02



1 NMST NEG NO 11913

MAT
3448

St Guillaume Train
Erwin






B&M
48100

Gas-Electric Rail Motor Cars, Canadian Pacific Railway.

The two gas-electric rail motor cars, which the Canadian Pacific Ry. has ordered from Ottawa Car Mfg. Co., will be, in all essential particulars, duplicates of the two secured in 1930, which were built by St. Louis Car Co., and supplied through International Equipment Co., and which were described and illustrated in Canadian Railway and Marine World for Aug., 1930, pg. 495. The two ordered recently, however, will include numerous details which will be made in Canada instead of the United States, thus providing cars of 90% Canadian manufacture. The only change of consequence will be the substitution of ET-6 airbrake equipment in place of the schedule AML combined automatic and straight air equipment.

The principal dimensions of the cars will be:—length inside coupler knuckles, throughout, and the circuit to be connected to the gasoline engine circulating system. A 32-volt lighting system will be employed, with Exide m.v.a.h. cells, which will also provide current for engine starting.

The trucks will be of cast steel type, the front one to carry the engine and motors and to have 6 x 11 in. journals; the rear truck, a trailer, will be fitted with 5 x 9 in. journals. The wheels will be of rolled steel type, 36 in. diam.

The power plant will consist of a 400 h.p. engine of 8-cyl. type, with cylinders 8 in. bore and 10 in. stroke, of Winton Engine Co. manufacture. Special winding built into the generator will make it adaptable for starting the engine from the batteries. Provision will also be made to use an air starting system when the air reservoirs on the car are charged.



Gas-electric Rail Motor Car, Canadian Pacific Railway, obtained in 1930.

74 ft.; truck centers, 52 ft. 10 in.; width over side sheeting, 9 ft. 9⅝ in.; height, rail to top of floor, 4 ft. 4 in.; height, rail to top of roof, 13 ft. 1¼ in.; length of engine room, 15 ft. 10 in.; length of baggage room, 20 ft. 2½ in.; length of smoking room, 8¾ ft.; length of main room, 23 ft. 4 in. The car framing will be of steel construction throughout. A wide vestibule will be provided at the rear end, with side and trap doors, and a two-fold canvas diaphragm with light vestibule face plate; the passenger room will be finished in mahogany and the baggage room with corrugated steel sheets. The headlining will be 0.06 in. sheet aluminum finished in cream enamel. Seating capacity for 50 will be provided, 36 in the main room and 14 in the smoking room. Seats will be fixed, the car being intended for front end operation only, and, in the main room, will be arranged to seat 3 persons on one side of the aisle and 2 on the other. All sash in the passenger end of the cars will be of brass. The cars will be heated by hot water, fin piping to be used Two gasoline tanks will be provided, each of 200 gall. capacity. The light weight of car will be about 136,600 lb. Further particulars as to equipment, relating to the preceding two cars, given in our Aug., 1930, issue, apply also to the cars about to be built, with the exception of the change in air brake schedule as stated above. The cars will be sent to Winnipeg upon completion.

Coal Consumption, Canadian National Rys.—The Minister of Railways and Canals, Dr. Manion, stated in the House of Commons recently, in answer to questions by R. K. Smith, Conservative, Cumberland, N.S., that the C.N.R. used, from April 30, 1930, to March 31, 1931, 2,433,300 tons of bituminous, 50,400 tons of sub-bituminous, and 161,300 tons of lignite coal, produced in Canada, 1,937,500 tons of bituminous and 9,900 tons of anthracite produced in the United States, and 7,900 tons of bituminous produced in Great Britain. The quantity of coal consumed by the C.N.R. on U.S.A. lines in the same period was 719,600 tons.

Rail and River Coal Co. and Canadian National Railways.

The Minister of Railways and Canals stated in the House of Commons recently in answer to questions by R. K. Smith, Conservative, Cumberland, N.S., that the Rail and River Coal Co., Cleveland, Ohio, continues to be owned by Canadian National Ry. Co., but is not operated by the parent company; that the average number of men employed during 1930 and so far in 1931 by the coal company is 1,526; that as far as the management is aware, the men are practically all union members with their locals at each mine; that coal production in 1930 by Rail and River Coal Co. was 1,856,911 tons; that the C.N.R. Canadian lines took 1,252,751 tons of coal from the company in 1930, the C.N. lines in United States taking 444,954 tons; that the price paid at the pit mouth for the coal was $1.2646 per ton; that there is no contract between the C.N.R. and the coal company for supply of coal by the latter to the former; that the C.N.R. pays nothing in the way of bond interest or maintenance and other charges in connection with the coal company; that the coal company's mines have not been idle during any part of 1929 and 1930; that the C.N.R. policy with regard to its coal areas in the United States is to use its own property in the best interests of the railway; that cost on coal mined at the pit mouth included 36c. a ton for interest on investment in the mines, exhaustion of minerals, etc., and that cost of transporting the coal by rail, from the mines to C.N.R. tracks, was as follows. per ton:—via Suspension Bridge, N.Y., $2.24; via Black Rock, N.Y., $2.24; via Port Huron, Mich., $1.67; via Windsor, Ont., $1.73; via Port Colborne, Ont., $1.76; via Niagara Falls, $2.24.

of the former Bruce Division, Ontario District, Canadian Pacific Ry., Toronto, July 1, was entertained at dinner at the Royal York Hotel, Toronto, Sept. 1, by officials and employes of the Ontario District, W. Fulton, Assistant General Passenger Agent, C.P.R., Toronto, being in the chair. He was presented with a purse of gold and a gold watch by R. W. Scott, Superintendent of the present Bruce Division, on behalf of the staff. He was born at Erin, Ont., Oct. 10, 1865, and entered C.P.R. service as assistant agent at Fergus, Ont., April 1, 1885, his subsequent appointments being Jan. 1886, agent and operator on Ontario District; July, 1902, train dispatcher, etc., Toronto; May 1, 1912, Chief Train Dispatcher, Toronto. He is a Freemason, being a member of Shekinah Chapter and of Stanley and Transportation Lodges.

J. B. Wood, Treasurer, Central Vermont Ry., addressed the Montpelier, Vt., Rotary Club, Sept. 14, his theme being that the argument for an advance in railway rates to protect railway credit and enable the carriers to maintain their property and service, and at the same time increase employment, is much stronger than the argument for huge expenditures of taxes upon public works, to give increased employment.

Roy V. Wright, President, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, will speak at a dinner meeting at the Royal York Hotel, Toronto, Oct. 2, at 6.30 p.m., on "Economics, the challenge to the engineer."

Railway Rolling Stock Orders and Deliveries.

Canadian Pacific Ry. received recently two gas-electric rail motor cars with the following principal dimensions:—length inside coupler knuckles 74 ft.; truck centers 52 ft. 10 in.; width over side sheeting 9 ft. 9-5/8 in.; height, rail to top of floor, 4 ft. 4 in., rail to top of roof, 13 ft. 1¼ in.; length of engine room 15 ft. 10 in.; length of baggage room 20 ft. 2½ in.; length of main passenger compartment 23 ft. 4 in.



Gas-Electric Rail Motor Car, Canadian Pacific Railway.

The car framing is of steel construction throughout. A wide vestibule is provided at the rear end, with side and trap doors, and a 2-fold canvas diaphragm with light vestibule face plate. The passenger rooms are finished in mahogany and the baggage room with corrugated steel sheets. The headlining is 0.06 in. sheet aluminum finished in cream enamel. Each car has seating capacity for 50, 36 in the main compartment and 14 in the smoking room. The cars being intended for front end operation only, seats are fixed. They are covered with plush in the main room, arranged to seat 3 persons on one side of the aisle and 2 on the other; in the smoking room, they are covered with leather. All sash in the passenger end of the cars is of brass. The cars are heated by hot water from coal-fired heater, located in the baggage room; fin piping is used throughout and the circuit is connected to the radiator circulating system of the engine. Two lavatories are provided with flush hoppers and folding wash basins, with gravity water supply from overhead tanks. A 32-volt lighting system is employed, which also provides current for engine starting.

The trucks are Commonwealth cast steel type; the front one, carrying the engine and motors, has 5 ft. 1 in. wheels; the rear one is fitted with 5 x 9 in. journals. The wheels are rolled steel type 36 in. diameter. The power plant is an Electro-Motive Co. model 148, 400 h.p. engine, 8-cylinder type, with cylinders 8 in. bore and 10 in. stroke. The electrical equipment is Westinghouse, also the air brake system, having the dead man safety features. Special winding built into the generator makes it adaptable for starting the engine from the batteries. Provision is also made to use an air starter system when the air reservoirs on the car are charged. Two gasoline tanks of 200 gall. capacity are provided. The light weight of each car is 136,000 lb.

The cars were built by Ottawa Car Manufacturing Co., Ottawa, and are being operated between Winnipeg and Arborg, Man., and Regina and Weyburn, Sask., respectively.

Canadian Pacific Ry. has received 6 first class cars and 6 tourist cars, the frames for which were built by Canadian Car & Foundry Co., the cars being finished at C.P.R. Angus shops, Montreal.

Canadian Pacific Ry. has received 3 parlor lounge cars, frames for which were built by National Steel Car Corp., the cars being finished at C.P.R. Angus shops, Montreal.

Canadian National Rys.—It was stated in Canadian Railway and Marine World for September that the C.N.R. was building two oil-electric switching locomotives at its Point St. Charles shops, Montreal. It should have been stated that it had ordered two complete power plants for a 600 h.p. oil-electric switching locomotive to be built at Point St. Charles. Two oil engines for the locomotive are

Co., at Sherbrooke, Que. The electrical equipment is being supplied by Canadian General Electric Co.

The World's Fastest Train.

A London, England, press dispatch states that the Great Western Ry.'s Cheltenham Flyer covered the 77.3 miles between London and Swindon in one hour on Sept. 14, and in 59 minutes on Sept. 15. The London Times is quoted as saying that beginning Sept. 14 the G.W.R. scheduled its Cheltenham-London afternoon express to cover the 77.3 miles from Swindon to Paddington in 67 minutes, an average speed of 69.2 m.p.h., this being claimed as the fastest start-to-stop train schedule in the world. Canadian Pacific train 38, the Royal York, runs regularly eastbound from Smiths Falls, Ont., to Montreal West, 124 miles, in 108 minutes, an average speed of 68.88 m.p.h.

Prior to the Great War, the Cheltenham Flyer ran non-stop from Kemble to Paddington, 91 miles, in 103 minutes. When normal services were restored, after the war, a stop at Swindon was scheduled, and the 77.3 miles to Paddington were run in 85 minutes. The time was reduced to 75 minutes, July 6, 1923, when the train became the fastest start-to-stop express in Great Britain. The train was withdawn on Sept. 24, 1928, but it was restored, July 8, 1929, when 70 minutes was the time allowed for the run, making it the fastest scheduled train in the world. In April, 1931, the Canadian Pacific train referred to exceeded the G.W.R.'s train's speed, but by reducing the Cheltenham Flyer's running time as specified above, the G.W.R. is again operating the world's fastest scheduled train.

Canadian Pacific Ry. Scholarships.—Three scholarships offered by the C.P.R. to sons of employes and junior employes of the company, tenable at McGill University, have been awarded as follows:—Michael M. Madge, son of H. Madge, station agent, Foster, Que.; David K. Gowans, son of D. J. Gowans, Assistant General Manager of Hotels, Eastern Lines; and Keith W. Shaw, son of J. A. Shaw, Consulting Electrical Engineer.

Transportation Club of Toronto held a luncheon meeting at the Royal York Hotel, Sept. 29. The Ontario Minister of Public Welfare, Mr. W. G. Martin, who was to have spoken on public welfare in the province, was unable to attend; an address on welfare work in Toronto was given by R. E. Thompson,

Boston and Maine engines assigned to Massawippi Valley
May 1926

1488	2-6-0	Manchester	1910	B-15-a	19x26	63"	X- 3-1953
2011	4-6-0	Manchester	1899	C—15-b	19x26	63"	X- 3-1928
2015	4-6-0	Manchester	1899	C-15-b	19x26	63"	X- 3-1928
2016	4-6-0	Manchester	1899	C-15-b	19x26	63"	X-10-1928
2100	4-6-0	Schenectady	1904	C-2	20x26	73"	X- 2-1935
2115	4-6-0	Schenectady	1905	C-2	20x26	73"	X- 9-1936
2125	4-6-0	Schenectady	1906	C-2	20x26	73"	X-10-1936
2371	2-8-0	Schenectady	1906	K-7	20x30	61"	X- 6-1929
2374	2-8-0	Schenectady	1905	K-7	20x30	61"	X-10-1936

2100's Class C-2 known as "grasshoppers" Records from GTR Train Registers Lennoxville

QUEBEC-CENTRAL-RAILWAY

THE DIRECT LINE BETWEEN QUEBEC

AND



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G. D. WADSWORTH
General Manager

J. T. HAWKINS
General-Freight and Passenger Agent

SHERBROOKE, QUEBEC.

7.250 U. Can Loc 60 Letter Mch 25/1926

the Canadian Pacific companies had filed a joint application for authority to be given the C.P.R. to lease the Boston and Maine line between Wells River and Derby, Vt., 69 miles.

The application was heard by the I.C. Commission, Feb. 8, a press report stating that shippers' representatives said the proposal was not objectionable, and J. Ward Carver, Attorney-General of Vermont, added that, subject to state law requirements, the project could be considered as in the public interest. Railway witnesses testified that by utilizing the section of the line under consideration, and other available stretches, the Canadian Pacific would be enabled to open a direct route south from Sherbrooke and to improve connections for general traffic. Decision was reserved.

The Massawippi Valley Ry. Co. was incorporated by the Parliament of Canada in 1862, to build a railway to connect Canadian railways with lines in Maine. It built a line from the Connecticut and Passumpsic River Rd's terminus near the Maine-Quebec boundary, to Lennoxville, Que., 31.95 miles, and a branch from Beebe Jct. to Stanstead, Que., 3.51 miles, and leased trackage rights over the Grand Trunk Ry. from Lennoxville to Sherbrooke, Que., 2.95 miles. The lines were opened for traffic in 1870, and were leased for 999 years from July 1, 1870, to the Connecticut and Passumpsic Rivers Rd., the lessee to pay interest on bonds and dividends on stock identical to those paid on its stock and bonds. The C. and P.R. Rd. was leased for 99 years from Jan. 1, 1887, to the Boston and Lowell Rd. Corporation, which in turn was leased to the Boston and Maine Rd. for 99 years from April 1, 1887. As the Massawippi Valley Ry. is in Canada, of course, no application in regard to it has to be made to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

MARCH 1926

January 13, 1928

Two trains collide at Sutton Junction.

On Tuesday afternoon at two o'clock the "pike" way freight and the way freight on the mail train met in a head on collision in the railway yards here.

Fortunately no one was seriously injured. The two engines were badly disabled and twelve cars of logs were overturned. The afternoon and evening pikes had to make their trips via Brookbury.

During October

1956 the Alouette gets RDC's CPR 9111 and Boston and Maine car 6212 made the first run

CHRA News November 1956

April 1917 Boston and Maine has order to install a bell at Comstock Bridge crossing near Lennoxville.

1920 The B&M bridge at Smith Mills (changed to Tomifobia) to be rebuilt.

Canadian Pacific 2-8-0 No. 3518 had just helped a heavy freight up a hill near Barton, Vt., in the dry summer of 1949 when th
discovered a brush fire and kept it under control with their cab wet-down hose until arrival of the Barton Fire Department.

Dr. Philip R. Hastings, 110 Sunset Rd., Waterloo, I



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

Photo Number: MAT005841
Photographer: unknown
Location: Newport, Vermont
Railway Name: BOSTON & MAINE RAILROAD
Caption: "Group of CRHA members on a turntable at Newport, Vermont with a B&M engine."
Subject: Steam locomotiveTurntableEmployees
Equipment Number: 264
Collection: Mattingly