CHAPTER VI.

1867 TO 1876

LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Effects of the Ashburton Treaty on the Location of the Line - Railways previously to confederation. - Commencement of Location Surveys. - Rival Routes through New Brunswick. - Military Considerations. - Rival Routes in Nova Scotia. - Line Recommended. - Controversy respecting the Route. - Action in Nova Scotia - The controversy carried to Ottawa. - Final adoption of the Combination Line. - Appointment of Commissioners. - The Contract System. - Tenders Received. - The Bridge Controversy. - The Engineer advocates Iron. - The Commissioners insist on Wood. - Iron finally adopted. - The Eastern Extension Controversy. - Line from Moncton to Amherst adopted. - Location between Miramichi and Moncton. - Construction proceeds under the Commissioners. - Completion of Line under Department of Public Works.

The location of the line being necessarily confined to British territory, it was forced to make a considerable *detour*, to avoid entering the State of Maine. Had no national considerations presented themselves, or had the boundary been laid down according to the Treaty of 1783, or even in accordance with the settlement proposed, and, to some extent, pressed by the United States some years prior to the Ashburton Treaty, there would have been no difficulty in securing a direct eligible route.

The Railway would, in this case, in all probability, have followed the general course of the route surveyed by Captain Yule, in 1837 for the St. Andrews and Quebec Railway, as far as the neighbourhood of the river St. John, but with such modifications and improvements as further surveys might have suggested. Owing to certain political influences Captain Yule was bound by his instructions to pass to the north of Mars Hill. Thus his line was deflected out of the direct course to the seaboard; and it is highly probable that untrammelled he would have followed a shorter route. It is evident, from an inspection of the map, and from the natural features of the country, that lines of railway might have been projected, so as to bring Montreal within 380 miles of St. Andrews, 415 miles of Saint John, and 650 miles of Halifax; and that the distance from Quebec to St. Andrews need not have exceeded 250 miles; 67 miles less than to Portland. Fredericton, the seat of local government, would have been on the main line to Halifax, and distant from Montreal about 370 miles; and these lines, moreover, would have been wholly within the limits of the Dominion had the international boundary been traced according to the true spirit and intent of the Treaty of 1783.

The distance between Montreal and Halifax might thus have been lessened nearly 200 miles. St. Andrews would have taken the place of Portland as the winter terminus of the Grand Trunk Railway, and would have commanded, together with Saint John, a traffic now cut off from both places, and centred at a foreign port.

The direct route would have brought the Springhill coal fields of Nova Scotia some 200 miles nearer to Montreal than by the present line of the Intercolonial, and would have rendered it possible to transport coal by rail at a comparatively moderate cost.

If, under such circumstances, an Intercolonial line to connect the cities of the Maritime Provinces with those of the St. Lawrence had been constructed, the building of 250 miles of railway representing an expenditure of $10,000,000 would have been unnecessary. Great as this

saving would have been, the economy in working it and in maintenance would have been more important. The direct line would also have attracted certain branches of traffic which by the longer route must either be carried at a loss or be repelled. These considerations render the difference in favour of the direct line incalculable, and cause the more regret that the treaty made by Lord Ashburton, which ceded British territory equal in size to two of the smaller States of the Union, rendered such a direct line through British territory forever impossible. Although it is too late to rectify this almost fatal error, it is important in a history of the Intercolonial Railway to recount all the steps by which so costly a consequence has been forced upon the Dominion.

It has already been mentioned that previous to Confederation in 1867, the separate Provinces had commenced, within their own limits, systems of railways demanded by their own requirements. In Canada proper a railway had been built from the river St. Clair, at the extreme West, through Toronto, Montreal, and Quebec, to river du Loup. In Nova Scotia, the line from Halifax to Truro had been completed; and in New Brunswick, Saint John had been connected with Shediac upon the Gulf of St. Lawrence. These important but distinct sections it became the first duty of the Dominion Government to connect by the most advantageous route possible through British territory.

The British North America Act, uniting the Provinces in one Dominion, came into force on the 1st. of July, 1867. One of the stipulations was that the Railway should be commenced within six months, and be finished within four years.

A week had not elapsed after the date of union when the Engineer-in-Chief received instructions from the Minister of Public Works to proceed with the surveys necessary to establish the location.

The season of 1867 was occupied in ascertaining the best position for the Railway between Truro and Amherst, and, in February of the following year, plans and profiles of a route from Truro to the boundary between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were submitted to the Government for approval.

In 1868, the surveys were continued on the whole line, and a large engineering staff was employed in examining the country between Nova Scotia and river du Loup. A controversy arose between the advocates of different routes through New Brunswick. The press teemed with articles on the subject, and the contest was carried into the Legislature and Privy Council of the Dominion. The chief contest was between a Northern or Bay Chaleur route, a Central route and a Frontier route by the valley of the river St. John, which for a great length, would be close to the boundary between New Brunswick and the State of Maine. The advocates of the Frontier route set military considerations altogether aside. They contended that since the day of Major Robinson, who first recommended the Northern route, the revolution in naval armaments had placed the two lines on an equality; that treaties had opened the Gulf of St. Lawrence to all nations; that there were no grounds for anticipating difficulties with the United States, as their interests were all on the side of peace; that, should any disturbing element arise, it would be settled by the pen, and not by the sword; and that, if the Railway should be constructed as a military road, it would be in danger wherever placed, and would, from that point of view, invite attack, while, if regarded as a commercial enterprise, its peaceful mission would be its protection. They further argued that a vast amount of public money would be saved by the adoption of the Frontier route. Owing to the length of line in operation which could be available, a much less

length of new railway would be required; 55 miles of railway, already constructed and in operation, being purchasable at a low price. They farther argued that, the valley of the river St. John being well settled, there would be a considerable revenue from the ordinary trade of the district; and that there would also be a large lumber trade from Aroostook, in Maine, as well as from the New Brunswick counties.

It was, however, asserted on the other side, that on the Northern line there were many large lumber establishments, some of which would turn out more sawn lumber than all the mills between Fredericton and the source of the St. John, including those in the Aroostook country; that such a line would certainly benefit and develop Aroostook; but what was wanted was a railway to develop the resources of Canada; and that the population per mile on the Northern route was much larger than that on the Frontier route, even including the population Or Aroostook, which amounted to about one-half of the total number named.

The advocates of the Northern route also claimed that the estimates of the Frontier line were placed at too low a figure, as the Railways offered for sale were sunk in debt, and were in such a bad condition as to require extensive repairs; and they contended that the Frontier line, in its entirety through to Truro, would be more costly by $1,000,000 than the Northern line. They also showed by the long-continued negotiations, that neither the Provincial nor British Governments ever lost sight of the necessity of consulting military considerations; and that one of the latest Colonial Secretaries had said emphatically that no line which did not secure the advantages of a safe military road would ever receive the countenance of the British Government.

The contest which was most persevered in was however between the Central and Northern routes; the Central being mainly advocated in the interest of the city of Saint John.

The safety of the railway from attack in time of war continued to occupy a prominent place in these discussions. It was asserted that the Northern route, recommended by Major Robinson because "passing at the greatest distance from the United States, and possessing in the highest degree the advantage of security from attack in case of hostilities," was, in reality, greatly exposed to attack, as, at several points, it was close to the sea; and that operations could be more successfully carried on against it than against the Central route, which, at all points was at least 30 miles distant from the American frontier. It was held that this distance was sufficient to make the Railway safe, or at least as safe as a considerable portion of the Grand Trunk Railway westwards from river du Loup; and that it would be so regarded by the British Government.

On the other side, it was denied that the Northern line was open to attack, as only vessels of light draught could enter the waters which it touched; and that an enemy's fleet could not enter the Gulf of St. Lawrence, except at the risk of being cut off from support and supplies; whereas, an attack could be much more readily made on the Central route, Saint John city and river being comparatively near American harbours. Besides, the long vulnerable portion of the Central line would not be so defensible as the portion of the Grand Trunk Railway lying nearest the American frontier, because, in the latter case, there was an intervening range of mountains impracticable for the passage of troops and heavy artillery; while in the former, the line passing into the valley of the St. John, the river would afford ready means of attack.

As in the case of the Frontier route, an argument was advanced in favour of the Central route on account of the less length of railway required. But to maintain this argument it was stated that no railways on the route would have to be purchased, because the companies owing

them would willingly grant running powers over such as were constructed. On the other side it was shown that the project was not in accordance with the designs of the British Government, as evidenced by their proposed guarantee being for £3,000,000, with the condition that the Dominion Government would raise a further £1,000,000, whilst the estimate of the cost on the Central route was less than the £3,000,000. It was accordingly argued that a continuous line of railway was contemplated, and not a connection with railways in operation. A forcible objection was made to the Central route, that one of the railways proposed as a connection was owned or controlled by citizens of the United States. Offers to carry troops in case of need were made to meet this argument. But it was evident such offers could not be enforced; on the declaration of war the railway companies could readily withdraw all their rolling stock within the United States frontier, and leave the railway useless to the Dominion though available to the enemy.

Some stress was laid on the amount of through freight which would follow the Central route to Saint John as a shipping port. It was however, contended that through freight from Montreal would take the line of the Grand Trunk Railway to Portland, and not a route 300 miles longer by river du Loup to Saint John. Also, it was contended that, in the matter of breadstuffs and provisions, the United States was the natural market for Saint John. Trade returns showed that, while restrictions were laid upon trade between the British North American Provinces and the United States, the supply of breadstuffs and provisions for Saint John went from Canada but when reciprocity prevailed this supply came from the United States, to the extent of 75 per cent. of the whole. It was further argued that, if reciprocity should be again established, the through freight would prove a nullity.

On the side of the Northern Line, it was argued that the natural trade of the populous region through which it would pass had, even during the existence of the Reciprocity Treaty, been with Canada; the imports of flour from the United States never having exceeded between 10 and 15 per cent. of the total imports, unless under exceptional circumstances.

It was said that the Central route had nothing in its favour which the Northern had not; but that the Northern had many special advantages over the Central and every other route. It would undoubtedly fulfil the national object for which the scheme was first originated, viz:-the creation of safe military road not open to sudden assault either by land or sea. It would pass through much well-settled country, including several important towns and villages; and would traverse many outlets by which lumber is brought from the interior. A considerable trade might be looked for in grain, and, eventually, in manufactures, from Ontario to the Maritime Provinces; and very probably return freight at cheap rates would be obtained in coals, minerals and fish.

The fish trade was held to be of great importance and worthy of being fostered as productive of profit. Fish, cured and dried, was sold for about three cents per pound; if packed in ice and transported to Quebec or Ontario it would bring, ten cents per pound. As the cost of curing and drying was equal to the cost of carriage, the ten cents per pound for the frozen fish would afford a larger profit to the fishermen, would foster this branch of trade, and would speedily develop this class of railway traffic.

The claims of Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland were urged in advocacy of the Northern route, inasmuch as it was generally considered desirable to consolidate the Dominion by including these Islands in Confederation; and it could not be doubted that the Northern route would be the most acceptable to them, particularly to Newfoundland, in view of the quick trans-

Atlantic route by way of that Island suggested by the Chief Engineer in his report of 1864.

While the discussion proceeded and the objections against each route were being answered by arguments based on commercial theories of profit; and while each particular route, in its turn, was zealously advocated and its merits enlarged upon by its friends, the Chief Engineer avoided all expression of opinion as to the line he held to be preferable; a course of action which was made a matter of reproach to him by both sides in the controversy. Viewing the course pursued, he entertains, after the lapse of years, the opinion by which he was then guided, that it was unnecessary and would have been impolitic, for him to have taken part, in any way, in the discussion.

When Mr. Fleming, entered upon the survey in 1864, his instructions on this point were very plain. He was not called upon to select what he held to be the most eligible line: indeed as he read his instructions, he considered it to be his duty to withhold all indications of preference. His own opinions were, however, explicitly and directly expressed, when it became his duty to place them on record. In March, 1868, he was requested by the Government to report on the route he held to be the best.

He replied that military considerations as well as the commercial capabilities of the line had to be regarded. With a prospective increasing traffic, the railway would probably become self-sustaining, but on the other hand, a line with little traffic, and with no likelihood of any great increase, threatened to become a permanent burden.

There appeared to be but little prospect of much local traffic on any of the routes. Agricultural prospects were nowhere extremely promising; and, except in Nova Scotia, the mineral resources of the country, as far as known, appeared of little importance. It was, indeed, difficult to foresee that any great development of purely local traffic would take place. The most exaggerated estimates of way business, on any of the routes, for a long time were anticipated to fall short of the cost of maintenance.

In the matter of through traffic, the fact had to be taken into consideration that a railway was being constructed to connect Saint John, New Brunswick, with Bangor in Maine, and thence with the railway systems of Canada and the United States. This line would be a formidable competitor to the Intercolonial Railway, if the latter were built on either a frontier or central route, while the route by the Bay Chaleur, and adoption of a port on that Bay, for ocean steamers, would enable the Intercolonial Railway to command a large share of the rapidly increasing mail and passenger traffic between Europe and America.

The Chief Engineer, after examining the arguments advanced in favour of each route, placed on record his opinion, that beyond a doubt, the line by the Bay Chaleur was the route to be adopted.

The Imperial authorities never lost sight of the military element which the railway should retain. On several occasions they clearly intimated that a northern or Bay Chaleur route was the one which they preferred; not only Major Robinson, but other military authorities pointed out the northern route as the proper location. The commissioners appointed to consider the defence of the Province of Canada reported in 1862 that no time should be lost in opening a road by the valley of the Metapedia to Metis on the St. Lawrence, and that, for the military purposes, the preference should be given to the line of Railway by the Bay Chaleur.

In 1864 the Deputy Director of fortifications, Colonel Jervois, reported that whilst the

Temiscouata route by Grand Falls and Fredericton to Saint John was, on account of its proximity to the American frontier, liable to be cut off at the commencement of hostilities, the route from Halifax through Nova Scotia and along the Eastern side of New Brunswick, called the Metapedia route, would afford access to Canada during war; and that, except at the part where it runs along the Southern shore of the St. Lawrence, where, owing to the nature and position of the country in the adjacent part of the States, it is scarcely subject to attack, the whole line might be held to be at such a distance from the frontier that it would not be liable to interruption by an enemy.

Were further evidence required of this feeling, it is to be found in the fact that the Duke of Buckingham sent a despatch to the Governor General in the spring of 1868, intimating that the Imperial guarantee would at once be made available provided the Bay Chaleur route was adopted, and, on receiving notification of the choice of route, the Duke forwarded a second despatch which fully establishes that the route by the Bay Chaleur was held to be the only line which provides for the national objects involved in the undertaking.*****

During the period that the location through New Brunswick was the matter of daily debate, the course of the line in Nova Scotia was also discussed, with equal warmth and pertinacity; more especially that portion, some thirty miles in length, in which the mineral districts adjoining the Cobequid mountains are included. The chief promoter of these discussions was Mr. John Livesey, who represented the Londonderry Iron Mines, and who for more than four years never ceased to put his views forward.

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(COPY CANADA, No. 155.)

MY LORD,

"I have received your Lordship's telegraphic message that the route by the Bay of Chaleur has been selected by the Canadian Government, as the one to connect Truro with River du Loup and thus complete the Intercolonial Railway."

"I understand three routes to have been under the consideration of the Government of Canada, namely, one crossing the St. John river either at Woodstock or Fredericton, the second in a more central direction through New Brunswick, and the third following the line selected by Major Robinson in 1848."

"The route crossing the St. John river, either at Woodstock or Fredericton, is one to which the assent of Her Majesty's Government could not have been given. The objections on military grounds to any line on the South side of the St. John river are insuperable. One of the main advantages sought in granting an Imperial guarantee for constructing the railway, would have been defeated, if that line had been selected."

"The remaining lines were the Central line and that following the general course of the route surveyed by Major Robinson, - and Her Majesty's Government have learned with much satisfaction that the latter has been selected by the Canadian Government. The communication which this line affords with the Gulf of St. Lawrence at various points, and its remoteness from the American frontier, are conclusive considerations in its favour, and there can be no doubt that it is the only one which provides for the national objects involved in the undertaking."

I have etc., etc.

Signed, Buckingham & Chandos.

To Governor the Right Honourable Viscount Monck.

From the time of the survey made in 1864, Mr. Livesey continually urged, both privately and officially, the importance of locating the railway on a route passing close to the furnaces of the Iron Mines in which he was interested.

Four different routes between Truro and a point of junction on the railway from Saint John to Shediac were examined and reported on; one was far to the east, another was far to the west, two were central. By combining parts of these central routes, two other routes were

compounded. Of the two central routes, one was essentially the same as that recommended by Major Robinson in 1847. The other was similar to that advocated by Mr. Livesey. It was by a combination of the two that the route called "Line 6" was formed, to cross the Cobequid Hills by the pass at Folly Lake and to descend by the northern slope of the Hills towards Amherst. It was held that this line would best accommodate all interests, having primary regard to general convenience.

In 1865, the Government of Nova Scotia directed Mr. Fleming to report on the best route from Truro to the boundary of the Province. In June of that year he recommended that a central route should be adopted. From commercial considerations, a central route appeared to him the most important, as it would accommodate the Iron District on the Cobequid Range, and open up the Springhill coalfield. He was accordingly instructed to proceed with the location of the most eligible line on a central route.

The working season of 1865 was occupied in surveys. Every pass across the Cobequid mountains, within the limits of the iron district, was examined, and every effort was made to secure a practicable line near the Iron works. Six lines were surveyed, designated by the letters A, B, C, D, E, F.

The first kept the southern slope of the Cobequid Mountains, crossing the Folly River and the two branches of the Great Village River, passing immediately on the South side of the Acadia Iron Works. Afterwards it turned northwards, and crossed to the north side of the hills by a gorge, known as Madison's Brook, and by Isaac's Lake on the summit, 686 feet above sea level.

The line B passed close to the Acadian Iron works, thence turning northwards it followed the Great Village River, on which the works are situated, to the summit at Sutherland's Lake, where the elevation is 745 feet above sea level.

Lines C, D, E and F all passed by Folly Lake, where they attained the summit level of 590 feet above sea level.

Of these lines, B was the shortest, but had the most objectionable grades. F was second in point of length, and had the most favourable grades. A was fourth in point of length, and second in favourable grades.

Line A, passing close to the Acadia Iron Works, was advocated by Mr. Livesey. The Chief Engineer, on the contrary, gave it as his opinion that, in view of its engineering features, he would recommend it for adoption.

The Engineer considered that lines A and F would equally well accommodate the Springhill coalfield; that though F would not accommodate the then existing iron works so well as A, it would equally well accommodate any extension of the works, and give much better accommodation to the traffic of the villages of the Gulf coast. He showed also, that, although Mr. Livesey had in some of his letters endeavoured to convey the idea that line F "just skirts the eastern edge" of the ore district, a former manager of the works had conveyed the impression that the ore deposits were equally on each side of F, and that they extended over a large area in both direction.

Other evidence of the same import was furnished by a map and pamphlet, issued some years previously in the interest of the iron mines, which contained reports of several mineralogists and mining engineers. One of these writers expressed his opinion that east of the Folly River there were deposits of ore sufficient to produce from 20,000 to 24,000 tons of metal

annually, while the works at that time situated to the west of Folly River were only capable of producing about 2,000 tons per annum. It was, however, possible to extend them so as to produce from 10,000 to 12,000 tons per annum. The map accompanying the pamphlet showed the "proposed site of new works," one on the Folly River, and another on Pine Brook, two miles east of Folly River.

It could not therefore be maintained that the route F, by Folly Lake, would not extend ample accommodation to the mineral region.

In August, 1865, a contract was entered into between the government of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, on the one side, and the Intercolonial Contract Company of London, on the other, for the construction of the railway between Truro and Moncton. The Government of Nova Scotia, having in May, 1866, received the report of the Chief Engineer, endorsed his views in reference to the Folly Lake route, Line F, and refused to sanction the construction of this portion of railway under the contract which they had made with the Intercolonial Contract Company, unless the Company adhered to line F.

The members of the Nova Scotia Government were personally on friendly relations with Mr. Livesey. And, as that gentleman took every opportunity of enforcing his views, the members of the government were fully informed of the importance of the iron works, and of the expediency of selecting a route as favourable to them as the general interests of the country would permit.

After Confederation the Chief Engineer received instructions from the Dominion Government to locate the line from Truro to Moncton. At this time the Dominion Ministry had Mr. Fleming's report of May 1866, approved of by the Nova Scotia Government. The marked feature of these instructions was that he should adopt the most eligible line, giving due weight to the cost of construction, cost of future working and management, and also to general interests.

From the above facts it is evident that no course was open to the Chief Engineer other than to follow the line designated F.

But Mr. Livesey was not satisfied with this course, and in September, 1867, he addressed a letter, enclosing a copy of the correspondence, to the then Minister of Public Works, and in consequence the Chief Engineer was instructed again to consider the case between the two routes with regard to:-

1st. "The local traffic likely to be obtained by these lines respectively."

2nd. "The development of natural sources of wealth in the vicinity of those lines respectively, by reason of their construction."

In September, 1868, the Chief Engineer according reported on the rival lines A and F, and showed that the line F was preferable to A under the considerations of length, cost of construction , grades and curves, and consequently in cost of future working and management. Although the line, as located, crossed and passed near to valuable deposits of iron ore, it did not run sufficiently near to the iron works to be of full service without the construction of a Branch, some 7 miles long.

The cost of construction of line F and a branch would be considerably less than that of line A, without adding to A for the extra cost of working it. It was of importance that the iron works should have the benefit of railway service, and it was desirable that the earliest possible connection, consistent with general interests, should be made with them and the Springhill coal

mines. It was considered that line F and a branch to the iron to mines would also extend a connection with the coal mines, so much more favourable for cheap transport than line A that it would prove to be the most economical route for mineral traffic.

The decision arrived at was based on a comparison of the lines. Line F passed over a summit 100 feet lower than that crossed by Line A; it was the best, the shortest, and, even including the branch to the iron mines, the cheapest, and was therefore entitled to the preference. A combination line was mentioned as having been traced on new ground between lines F and A. It was four miles longer than line F but reduced the branch from seven miles to three. In the comparison, the Engineer considered the combination line second in point of merit, to line F, and in his opinion line A was the least favourable of the three.

On the other hand Captain Tyler, Government Inspector of Railways, England was applied to Mr. Livesey, and reported in July 1868, that in his opinion, taking into account cost of construction, working over the super-elevations, counter gradients and the curves on steep gradients, line A would be considered cheaper than line F; that the construction of line F instead of him, from every point of view, to be great mistake; and that the manufacture of iron in a cheap form by the use of Springhill coal was of so great importance that "such an obstruction to the development of such resources, as the construction of line f *when line A is available and less costly,* would be nothing less than a general misfortune to the industrial interests of the Dominion."

In replying to this letter of Captain Tyler, the Chief Engineer stated that he was satisfied that Captain Tyler, and Mr. Atkinson who had worked out the calculations for Captain Tyler, were not in possession of all the information which the survey afforded, and therefore that their conclusions, based on imperfect data, could scarcely be correct; and he repeated that without capitalizing the extra cost of working line A, this line would cost, in construction alone, about. $100,000 more than line F with a branch to the iron mines; that line F was the cheapest to operate, the shortest, and as far as he could judge, the best in every respect.

During the months of September and October, 1868, Mr. Livesey had test pits sunk in nineteen cuttings on line A, which had been assumed in the Chief Engineer's estimates as either wholly or almost wholly rock, and he reported that a very large deduction should consequently be made from the estimated cost of line A. This deduction was at once made by the Chief Engineer; but nevertheless he saw no reason to make any material change in views he had expressed, and he maintained that although line A had been surveyed, tested, revised and improved by repeated trial surveys, it remained substantially as it had been originally described by him; and that it was his deliberate opinion that, taking the two lines as they were then represented by plans and profiles, line F was capable of doing, at the same cost of working expenses, at least ten per cent. more business than line A, and that no improvements could be made in line A that would materially lower the cost of working, without at the same time greatly increasing the cost of construction.

Other parties took part in the discussion, amongst whom were the Honourable R. B. Dickey, the Honourable A. W. McLelan, afterwards one of the Railway Commissioners, Mr. Morrison, M.P.P. for Colchester, and Mr. Purdy, M.P.P. for Cumberland.

Notwithstanding that the Government of Nova Scotia had, in 1866, endorsed the views of the Chief Engineer with regard to line F, the Executive Council of Nova Scotia, on 3rd. August

1868, passed a Minute, which was approved by His Excellency, the Lieutenant Governor, to the effect that in the interests of the Province, the location of line A should be adopted in preference to that of line F.

It was stated by one of the gentlemen referred to, in a letter dated 21st. September 1868, that this Minute of Council, though passed on 3rd. August, was not communicated to the House of Assembly until 15th. September, and that the House of Assembly was indignant at the action of the Government. Three days afterwards the House of Assembly passed a resolution in favour of the Folly Lake route, line F.

A few days after the passing of this resolution, the Chief Engineer, by request of the Government of Nova Scotia, met the Members of Council at Halifax. There were, however, only three members present. After hearing full explanations, they concurred in the views of the Engineer with respect to the adoption of line F, and freely told him to state to the Dominion Government the result of the interview. They further intimated that they would make a Minute of Council, expressing their concurrence, but that they felt themselves precluded from doing so by the minute which they had previously been induced to pass, without sufficient knowledge of the facts.

The controversy was carried to Ottawa. One Nova Scotia gentleman, in pressing his views on the notice of the Secretary of State for the Dominion, drew attention to the claim advanced on behalf of the iron mines with respect to the large capital invested by the company, and met this claim by saying that the people in the villages on the Gulf coast had invested infinitely more capital in building wharves, clearing lands, building roads, bridging streams, opening stone quarries, building ships, working copper mills, and that they were at that time employing more men, developing interests of more read and lasting benefit, and contributing more to the Dominion revenues, than the mining company. He contended that all this population, which he estimated at 10,000, should not be forced to pass over 12 miles more of mountain roads to get to the railway, because the Mining Company had located their works on the last eligible route.

February 8, 1999